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Interbank Discipline
Kathryn Judge
ABSTRACT
As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly
interconnected. This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that
has important policy ratnifications yet remains largely unexarined a draratic rise
in interbank discipline lThe Article demonstrates that today's large, conplex banks
have flrancial incentives to monitor risk taking at other banks, They also have the
infrastructure, competence, and information required to be fairly effective monitors and
mechanisms through which they can reTond when a bank changes its risk profile.
Interbank discipline thus affects bank risk taklng, discohuraging banks from taling some
types of risk while potentially encouraging the assumption of others. Given its influence,
ign)rig the phenmeon can lead to ineffciencies and gaps in bank regulation,
The rise of interbank discipline has positive and negative ramifications from a Social
wIfare perspective. 'The good niv s is that self interested banks may be expccted to
penalize a bank when it takes excessive risks, thereby deterring such risk taking. he
bad itvs is that the interests oftbanks and sotiet are not a]hvavsso well alignead Other
banks, fir example, may be expected to reward a bank when it changes its risk profile in
a way that increases the probability that the government would bail the bank ott rather
than allowing it to fail. This is because a bailout protects a banks counterparties and
other creditors, even though socially costly Interbank disciplinet ma thus encourage
barks to alter their activities in ways that increase systenic fragility
In drawing attention to the powerffd yet mixed effects of interbank discipline on bank
Its aim is not to question whether weneed regulation, but to address the pressing
issue of ho vwe should allocate inherently finite regulatory resources. By reducing
the regula tiny resources devoited to activities thmt ither bmnks are perfbrming relatively
well, increasing the resouirces devoted ti actiities that regul~ators are uiq uely situamted
or incented to addres and seelng ti counteract the adverse effects of interbank
discipline, bank oversight could ev red i to more efpectively promote the stabilit
of the fnancial systrn.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States and other nations are in the process of fundamentally re-
thinking how best to regulate banks. The 2007 08 financial crisis (the Crisis)
triggered a global effort to reformulate financial regulation for the twenty-
first century, and most changes adopted thus far respond directly to weaknesses
revealed by the Crisis. The success of efforts to design a financial regulatory re-
gime capable of meeting the challenges ahead, however, depends on policymak-
ers looking past the immediate causes of the Crisis to consider how the financial
system has evolved in recent decades and the significance of those changes. This
Article sheds new light on one such development and the lessons it holds for pol-
icymakers interested in creating a more stable financial system.
One of the most significant changes in the financial system over the last
three decades has been a transformation in the nature of banks and banking.1
Traditionally, the majority of a bank's interactions were with consumers and
companies. Banks accepted deposits and made loans, facilitating maturity, cred-
it, and liquidity transformation. Banks still engage in these activities, and they
remain the primary activities of many community-based banks. But a new breed
of banks has come to dominate the financial landscape: the large, complex finan-
cial institution (referred to here as "complex banks").2 In addition to taking de-
posits and extending loans, complex banks engage in a wide variety of other
activities, including using credit default swaps and other derivatives to reallocate
risk, making markets for securities and other financial instruments, and engag-
ing in other trading activity. These activities significantly increase interbank ex-
posure. At the same time, using financial innovations like securitization-which
enables banks to sell loans they originate into a secondary market rather than
holding all such loans to maturity-complex banks have reduced their direct
credit exposure to the consumers and firms with whom they work. As a result,
the primary source of credit risk for today's complex banks is other banks.4
1. The term bank has been construed in a range ofways, with some using it to encompass "any financial
intermediary... whether or not... regulated by banking regulators." RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE
CRISIs OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 9 (2010). This Article takes an intermediate approach. It
uses the term only for firms that are regulated as banks or bank holding companies, but it includes
financial institutions that would not have been considered banks, in the traditional sense, prior to
the Crisis.
2. The analysis focuses on the largest, most complex institutions that have come to dominate the bank-
ing landscape, see infra Part I.B, but much of the analysis extends to a broader swath ofbanking insti-
tutions.
3. See infra PartI.B.
4. See infra PartlII.B.
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This transformation in banking has been well documented.5 Policymak-
ers and others are attuned to this development and to the potential for connec-
tions among banks to contribute to systemic fragility by increasing the probability
that a weakness at one bank will lead to problems at others.' They have also
started to respond.7 Concerned about the safety and soundness of Bank A, for
example, regulators have sought to ensure that Bank A has a risk management
system that enables it to monitor its credit exposure to Bank B and adjust its ex-
posure in light of changes in Bank B's risk profile. The aim of this oversight is to
reduce the risk that Bank A will be harmed if Bank B gets into trouble. What
has gone relatively unexamined, however, is the effect of Bank A's monitoring
and disciplining of Bank B on Bank B. That is the focus here. The Article builds
on the simple insight that if Bank A penalizes Bank B for some actions, but not
others, the discipline Bank A imposes on Bank B alters Bank B's incentives and,
consequently, its activities.
Shifting the focus in this manner provides two important insights into the
significance of the rise in interbank activity. First, the Article reveals that banks
today are subject to much more robust market discipline than is commonly ap-
preciated. Policymakers and academics have long advocated using the market to
discipline banks.8 Advocates of market discipline, however, most often approach
5. See infta Part I.A.
6. E.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
Brookings Institution Conference on Structuring the Financial Industry to Enhance Economic
Growth and Stability, Industry Structure and Systemic Risk Regulation 2 (Dec. 4, 2012), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo2Ol2l2O4a.htm (noting that "large fi-
nancial institutions transact with one another on a nearly continuous basis and regularly maintain
contractual relationships carrying substantial future obligations," which means that "[the daily
operations of most firms in the financial industry depend to a much greater extent on the
conditions of their competitors than do such operations of firms in other industries").
7. E.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BD. OF
GOVERNORS OFTHE FED. RESERVE SYS. & OFFICE OFTHRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY
SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE ON COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 2 (2011) [here-
inafter INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE] ("set[ting] forth sound practices and supervisory expec-
tations," with respect to managing "the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default or
deteriorate in creditworthiness," including monitoring and aggregating individual counterparty
exposures, regularly evaluating the creditworthiness of counterparties, and adjusting limits with
respect to counterparties based on those assessments); Lending Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,265 (proposed
June 21, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 32, 159, 160) (proposing to expand the definition of
credit exposure and imposing more stringent limitations on a bank's maximum credit exposure to
another entity for banks under the Office of the Comprtoller of the Currency's (OCC's) jurisdiction);
Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77
Fed. Reg. 594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (making similar proposals applicable to banks under the
Federal Reserve's jurisdiction and proposing other rules designed to improve banks' risk
management practices).
8. See infra PartlI.B.
the topic by focusing on an identifiable class of stakeholders, such as depositors
or subordinated debtholders, and examining that constituency's incentives to
monitor and discipline a bank's activities.' Some commentators have recog-
nized that banks may be uniquely well suited to the role of disciplining other
banks, but they have tended to suggest that some regulatory change must be
made for banks to have adequate incentives to monitor and discipline one anoth-
er.' 0 This Article challenges that assumption. It shows that banks often have
myriad relationships with other banks. When the credit exposures arising from
these various relationships are aggregated, as banks increasingly (and soon must)
do, it becomes apparent that banks have massive economic exposure to one an-
other." Far more often than not, financial companies top the list of industry ex-
posures for complex banks like Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, and Goldman Sachs,
surpassing categories like real estate, healthcare, and central banks.' 2 Moreo-
ver, a recent study reveals that the largest complex banks often have credit ex-
posure to other individual banks and counterparties at levels approaching 25
percent of the bank's regulatory capital.' 3 Banks thus have strong economic in-
centives to monitor and discipline other banks, in addition to being relatively
well suited to these tasks. This does not mean that banks are perfect disciplinari-
ans; they are not. But it does suggest that interbank discipline is a sufficiently
powerful market force to merit much more attention than it has received thus
far.14
Second, this Article highlights the mixed effects of market discipline.
Some effects are clearly positive. If a bank starts taking excessive risks, other
banks should notice and respond accordingly. Banks do this for self-interested
reasons-a bank does not want to assume excess credit risk unless it is compen-
sated accordingly. Nonetheless, this self-interested activity by banks promotes
9. See infaPartI.B.
10. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63
STAN. L. REV. 539, 555-56 (2011) (recognizing that derivatives counterparties (largely banks) are
more likely to have the skills necessary to discipline other banks while assuming that banks lack
adequate incentives to do so because of protections afforded to derivative counterparties under the
Bankruptcy Code); see also sources cited infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(e)(3),
124 Stat. 1376, 1428 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (Supp. V 2011)) (expanding the definition
of credit exposure to include repurchase agreements ("repos"), reverse repos, and other securities
financing transactions and derivative transactions, in addition to loans and traditional sources of
credit risk); Lending Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. at 37,272; Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early
Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. at 600.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. Letter from The Clearing House et al, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., at Annex C (Apr. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Clearing House Letter to Fed.].
14. See inftaPartlII.D.
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social welfare by discouraging other banks from taking excessive risks and penal-
izing them when they do. The challenge is that the interests of banks and socie-
ty are not always so well aligned. When they deviate, interbank discipline may
incent banks to alter their activities in ways that increase their wellbeing while
making the financial system as a whole less stable.
Many of the gaps between the interests of banks and the interests of society
become manifest in periods of financial distress, as the interbank market tends
to contract more than is socially optimal. Such discrepancies have received sig-
nificant attention from academics and policymakers and serve as a primary ra-
tionale for the Federal Reserve's role as a lender of last resort when banks are
facing liquidity shortfalls.'5 Yet, the shadow of possible government interven-
tion gives rise to discrepancies even outside of these exceptional periods. The per-
ception that a bank is too big to fail, for example, changes the willingness of a
bank's counterparties and other creditors to work with the bank.'6 The greater
the expected probability that the government will bail the bank out-to avert
the social costs of allowing it to fail-the less reason a bank's creditors have to be
concerned about its financial health.
A bank's size, however, is not the only feature that can cause the social costs
of a bank's demise to dwarf the losses incurred by the bank and its stakeholders,
creating a good chance of a government bailout. The probability of a bailout also
goes up when a bank is "too interconnected" or "too correlated," and interbank
discipline may play a particularly important role rewarding a bank for such be-
havior." Interbank discipline encourages banks to become more interconnected
because a bank doubly benefits when it enters into a new relationship with anoth-
er bank. The bank itself becomes more interconnected, increasing the probabil-
ity it will be bailed out. Further, the credit risk the bank assumes with respect to
the other bank is reduced, at the margins, by the increased probability the other
bank will be bailed out. Similarly, in order to assess whether the types of risks a
bank is exposed to are closely correlated to the risk exposures of other banks, a
party must not only understand a bank's risk profile, but also the risk profiles of
other banks. A typical subordinated debtholder lacks the incentives to do the ad-
ditional due diligence necessary to obtain that information. By contrast, the
typical complex bank is already working with and monitoring most other banks.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infta PartI.A.
17. A bank is too correlated when it has a risk profile that is similar to the risk profiles of other banks,
making it likely that the correlated banks would face financial distress at the same time and
policymakers would need to consider the social cost of their collective failure in deciding whether to
intervene. See infra Part IIIB.
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Complex banks thus commonly possess the information necessary to make
informed judgments about how correlated a bank's risk profile is to other banks,
making it more likely that they will respond-by rewarding-changes in this as-
pect of a bank's risk profile. In drawing attention to these and other dynam-
ics, the Article shows how interbank discipline may function as a mechanism
through which banks can take advantage of the government subsidy inherent
in the possibility of a government bailout. It also shows how interbank disci-
pline may increase systemic risk.
Drawing attention to the mixed effects of market discipline is one way this
Article contributes to a new generation of literature on market discipline. The
notion of market discipline has gone out of vogue in the wake of the Crisis, and
understandably so. Early advocates of market discipline too often believed that
market participants' self-interest could be relied on to create a stable financial sys-
tem and achieve other socially valuable ends." The Crisis revealed the fallacy of
this assumption. The self-interest of market participants is far from perfectly
aligned with the interests of society, and market participants can make mistakes,
just like regulators. Yet the answer is not to ignore market discipline. As reflect-
ed in the significant number of missed deadlines and delays plaguing the imple-
mentation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (the Dodd-Frank Act),19 the effort to shift fill responsibility for achieving a
stable financial system to regulators has left them overwhelmed. Once we recog-
nize the inherently finite nature of regulatory resources and that regulators and
market participants often have different skills in addition to different incen-
fives, market discipline can be used as a roadmap to help establish regulatory
priorities and determine how to best deploy regulatory resources.
While the primary aim of this Article is to draw attention to the power of
interbank discipline and shed light on its effects, it also makes recommendations
about how policymakers should respond to those effects. As an initial matter,
the dynamics revealed here provide additional support for many of the reforms
already underway. For example, to the extent that the Dodd-Frank Act's orderly
liquidation provisions succeed in reducing the probability that the government
18. E.g., The Financial Crisis and the Role of the Federal Regulators: Hearing Bcfore the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110t± Cong. 16-18 (2008) (statement of Dr. Alan Greenspan, former
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).
19. DAvIS POLK, DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT 2 (2013), http://www.davispolk.com/files/
Publication/900769d7-74f0-474c-9bce-0014949f0685/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
3983137e-639b-4bbc-a901-002b21e2e246/Apr2Ol3_Dodd.Frank.Progress.Report.pdf (noting
that "[als of April 1, 2013, a total of 279 Dodd-Frank rulemaking requirement deadlines have
passed . .. [of which] 176 (63.l1%) have been missed and 103 (36.9%) have been met with finalized
rules" and that "[r]egulators have not yet released proposals for 65 of the 176 missed").
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will intervene to bail out a bank, some of the problematic effects of interbank dis-
cipline will be lessened. 20 At the same time, such changes do not moot the need
for further reform in light of interbank discipline. These reforms will never elim-
inate the chance of a government bailout and there remain benefits of interbank
discipline that the current regime fails to harness. 21
The Article's policy recommendations are nonexhaustive and necessarily
preliminary in nature. Most arise from an analysis of the relative institutional
competence of banks and regulators and rely in part on the finite nature of regu-
latory resources. Recognizing the mixed effects of interbank discipline and the
differing skill sets of banks and regulators suggests that we should establish reg-
ulatory priorities that complement, support, and counteract, as appropriate, the
effects of interbank discipline. More specifically, the Article proposes reducing
the regulatory resources devoted to activities that are duplicative of those already
performed by banks, increasing the resources devoted to activities that regulators
are uniquely motivated or positioned to address, and seeking ways to counteract
the problematic effects of interbank discipline.
The Article further suggests that the effects of interbank discipline, coupled
with the transformation of banking from which it arises, may merit a more fun-
damental rethinking of the role of bank examinations. More specifically, it may
be time to reconsider whether bank examiners should continue to be required to
reach firm conclusions regarding the safety and soundness of complex banks.
While bank examiners' assessments are not made public, banks and other mar-
ket participants know, and potentially rely on, examiners' obligation to reach
broad conclusions about a bank's wellbeing. Revising the nature of the conclu-
sions that bank examiners are asked to reach may improve market discipline by
making the limits of oversight clear. It could also facilitate a shift toward a re-
gime that more effectively harnesses the power of banks and regulators in ways
that reflect their relative incentives and competence.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides background. It consid-
ers the primary rationales for regulating banks and the social costs of bank fail-
ures. This Part also provides an overview of the ways that banking has changed
over the last three decades, focusing on the rise of complex banks. These new
complex banks, and the connections among them, are the focus of this Article.
Part I concludes by situating this Article's analysis of interbank discipline in the
literature on market discipline.
20. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. II, 124
Stat. 1376, 1442-1520 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394 (Supp. V 2011)).
21. See infra PartlI.B.
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Part II examines interbank discipline. It uses publicly available information
about banks' risk exposures to show that other banks are a leading source of cred-
it exposure for most complex banks. This Part also draws on information about
banks' risk management practices, and changes in those practices, to demonstrate
why interbank exposures are likely to translate into active monitoring of banks by
other banks. And, this Part describes the mechanisms through which banks can,
and do, discipline one another. It further considers evidence that banks' efforts
to manage other risks that arise from interbank activity-such as operation
risks-separately contribute to interbank discipline. This Part concludes by
considering the significance of the Crisis, and the reasons that the Crisis does
not undermine this Article's claims regarding the importance of interbank disci-
pline.
Part III addresses the institutional competence and incentives of banks as
disciplinarians. It explains why banks may be more effective at monitoring and
disciplining each other than most other market participants and it considers em-
pirical evidence supportive of their efficacy. Part III also draws attention to the
ways that banks' interests systematically deviate from those that are socially opti-
mal. In so doing, it shows how interbank discipline may cause banks to modify
their behavior in ways that benefit the banks involved while simultaneously con-
tributing to the fragility of the financial system. Part III thus sheds light on the
probable effects of interbank discipline, and provides a basis for considering how
policymakers should respond.
Part IV describes the bank oversight process and the leading bank regula-
tors, the final pieces of information necessary to make meaningful recommenda-
tions about the policy ramifications of interbank discipline. This Part highlights
the advantages that bank examiners enjoy relative to market participants, includ-
ing inside access and an array of tools for changing a bank's activities. It also
sheds light on pragmatic considerations that shape how regulators use the ad-
vantages afforded to them.
Part V proposes some steps for crafting a path forward. It examines the
policy implications of interbank discipline in light of the relative institutional in-
centives and competencies of banks and regulators. This Part proposes modest
steps that could be taken to reduce the adverse consequences of interbank disci-
pline while harnessing the socially productive dimension of this phenomenon.
The proposals include specific suggestions, such as using the information that
the interbank market helps produce as a component in determining the premium
a bank must pay for its government-provided deposit insurance. Finally, Part V
shows how the analysis in this Article supports a more fundamental rethinking of
the aims of bank examination.
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part introduces the rationales for bank regulation. It then describes the
changing nature of banking and the role given to market discipline in the cur-
rent regime. 22
A. Banking and Banking Regulation
Of the numerous explanations given for regulating banks, two tend to dom-
inate.23 The first relates to deposit insurance. Because banks invest their capital
in long-term assets, like loans, while receiving much of that capital from short-
term liabilities, like demand deposits, banks are inherently unstable. 24 No bank
has sufficient liquid assets to repay all of its depositors should they demand their
money back at the same time. Deposit insurance promotes bank stability, a so-
cial good, by eliminating a depositor's incentive to be first in line to get his mon-
ey back at the first sign that a bank may be in trouble.25 The challenge is that
deposit insurance also gives rise to moral hazard. If depositors can rely on the
government to insure their deposits, they have little reason to monitor or restrain
bank risk taking.26 As a result, a bank that engages in risky behavior can obtain
capital from deposits on substantially the same favorable terms as a bank pursu-
ing a more conservative course of conduct. As greater risks generally lead to
22. Many of the issues this Article addresses, including the transformation in banking and the rise of
interbank discipline, are international phenomena. Nonetheless, because context and history are at
times significant, the Article focuses on the United States when appropriate and it uses U.S. banks
and regulators as the relevant reference points.
23. See MarkJ. Flannery, Supervising Bank Safety and Soundness: Some Open Asues, 92 FED. RES. BANK
ATLANTA ECON. REV., nos. 1 & 2, 2007, at 83, 85-86 (summarizing the rationales that have
been given for bank regulation and identifying the moral hazard created by deposit insurance and
the social costs ofbank failures as the two most important).
24. Douglas W. Diamond &Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, DepositInsurance, andLiquidity, 91 J. POL.
ECON. 401, 402-03 (1983) (demonstrating why even a solvent bank may be subject to a
debilitating bank run).
25. See id. at 418.
26. Jens Forssbccck, Ownership Structure, Market Discipline, and Banks' Risk-Taking Incentives Under
Deposit Insurance, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 2666, 2666 (2011) ("What deposit insurance does is to
remove depositors' incentives to discipline the bank by charging a risk premium commensurate
with the bank's risk level, their own costs of monitoring, and other agency-related costs .
Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Disciline by Depositors: A Summary of the
Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 220 (1988) ("[Dlepositors will be
indifferent between putting their money in insured, riskless banks at riskiess rates of return and
putting their money in uninsured, risky banks at higher, risk-adjusted rates of return. .. )
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greater returns, banks with insured deposits have an incentive to take excessive
risks.27
The second and related rationale for regulating banks arises from the social
costs of bank failures, particularly when part of a financial crisis. As reflected in a
recent study, systemic banking crises are associated with "deep and prolonged"
declines in asset values, "profound declines in output and employment," and an
increase in government debt that averages 86 percent in the three years following
the crisis. 28 Because these costs far exceed the losses incurred by the banks and
their stakeholders, banks lack the requisite incentive to restrain their risk taking
to a socially optimal level. Exacerbating this incentive problem, and transform-
ing it into a source of moral hazard, is the fact that governments often intervene
to prevent a bank from failing when the externalities from allowing it to fail are
sufficiently large.29
There have been meaningful attempts to reduce both of these sources of
moral hazard. The primary mechanism for trying to reduce the moral hazard
arising from deposit insurance is the use of risk-based premiums.30 If the premi-
um a bank pays for deposit insurance accurately reflects the probability that the
bank will fail and the cost to the insurance fund of its failure, the moral hazard
largely disappears. 3' Banks that take greater risks will internalize the costs of
those decisions through higher premiums.32 Experience has shown, however,
that risk-based premiums are not a panacea and cannot be relied on to alleviate
the moral hazard deposit insurance creates.33 The premiums banks pay for de-
27. Forssbceck, supra note 26, at 2677 ("[T]he existence of deposit insurance ... introduces a subsidy
on increased risk"); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, Solving the Corporate Governance
Problems of Banks: A Proposal, 120 BANKING L.J. 326, 328 (2003) ("[T]he implementation of
deposit insurance poses a regulatory cost of its own-it gives the shareholders and the managers of
insured banks incentives to engage in excessive risk taking.").
28. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 224 (2009).
29. DARRELL DUFFIE, How BIG BANKS FAIL AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 5 (2011) ("[T]he
common knowledge that too-big-to-fail financial institutions will receive support when they are
sufficiently distressed-in order to limit disruptions to the economy-provides an ... incentive to
large financial institutions to take inefficient risks, a well-understood [source of] moral hazard.").
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2006).
31. GEORGEJ. BENSTON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE AND SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE 230 (1986).
32. Id at 231.
33. Compare id. at 227-43 (advocating risk-based insurance premiums), with Robert A. Eisenbeis,
Hindsight and Foresight About Safe and Sound Banking, in Roundtable Discussion: Reflection on
Twenty Years ofBank Regulatory Reform, 92 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV, nos. 1 & 2,
2007, at 124, 124 (explaining the challenges posed in translating risk-based deposit insurance into
practice and that its importance has been overstated), and George Kaufman, Some Further Thoughts
About the Road to Safer Banking, in Roundtable Discussion: flection on Twenty Years of Bank
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posit insurance continue to be risk based, but the appropriate formulas to use re-
main a matter of ongoing debate.34
There have also been attempts to reign in the moral hazard arising from
government bailouts. A central aim of the Dodd-Frank Act is to reduce the
probability of future bank bailouts and a number of its provisions effectively fur-
ther this aim.3 The Act, for example, attempts to make it easier for regulators to
close systemically significant banks, thereby reducing the temptation to prop up a
failing firm.3 6 At the international level, the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision, the leading multinational forum on bank regulation, is similarly revis-
ing its capital adequacy and other requirements in order to reduce and combat
this source of moral hazard.37 The reforms include efforts to cause a bank to in-
ternalize, on an ongoing basis, additional costs when it becomes too big to fail
or otherwise changes its risk profile in a way that increases the probability its
government would feel obliged to prevent it from failing.
The government has a long history, however, of attempting to reduce this
moral hazard. While such efforts have at times succeeded in reducing market
expectations regarding the probability of a bailout, the problem has never been
eliminated.38 Moreover, many view the Crisis as affirming the principle that the
government will inevitably intervene to save an institution when the costs of
its failure are sufficiently great.39 Academics, like Adam Levitin, have provided
Regulatory Reform, supra, at 135, 135 (explaining that with the benefit of hindsight and experience,
he is no longer "enamored with risk-related ex ante FDIC deposit insurance premiums").
34. See, e.g., Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,672, 10,676 (Feb. 25, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327) (describing proposed changes to the process for calculating the so-
called premiums to be paid by large banks and open issues regarding implementation).
35. Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Dodd-Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash and Too Big to Fail, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 69, 70, 76-80 (2011) ("describ[ing] how Dodd-Frank ... attempts to change the
phrase 'too big to fail' to 'too big, will fail"' and providing a summary of the key provisions in Dodd-
Frank designed to reduce the likelihood of future government bailouts).
36. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. II, 124
Stat. 1376, 1442-1520 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394 (Supp. V 2011).
37. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 7 (2011) [hereinafter
BASEL III] (describing how the Basel III framework seeks to implement an "integrated approach" to
addressing the challenges posed by "systemically important financial institutions" which could
include "capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt").
38. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of
Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 994-1001 (1992) (describing the mixed success of
efforts to limit the moral hazard that arose following the 1984 rescue of Continental Illinois on the
basis of its being too big to fail).
39. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 141 (2012) [hereinafter
ESOC, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT] ("[MV]any observers interpret actions taken by government
authorities during the recent crisis as evidence that the public sector provides an implicit guarantee
to large complex financial institutions.").
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theoretical support for the notion that it is impossible to eliminate this source of
moral hazard completely.40 In Levitin's analysis, "[b]ailouts are an inevitable fea-
ture of modem economies," because any "standardized resolution system" that
may be adopted ex ante will, at times, result in "socially unacceptable" outcomes
if adhered to when a crisis actually hits.4 In the face of such an outcome, poli-
cymakers will almost assuredly find a way around the precommitment device
they had previously fashioned.42 Hence, the possibility of a bailout cannot be re-
duced to zero so long as bank failures impose costs on parties other than the
bank and its stakeholders.
In light of the externalities that may arise from bank failures, and the moral
hazard created by deposit insurance and the inevitable possibility of a govern-
ment bailout, governments have long imposed an array of regulations on banks.
As reflected in the three "pillars" put forth by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, the tools most commonly used to limit bank risk taking are (1) the
imposition of capital adequacy requirements, (2) supervisory oversight, and (3)
market discipline.43 Many countries supplement these measures in a variety of
ways, as reflected in the Volcker Rule in the United States, which limits the types
of activities in which banks can engage, and new rules in the United Kingdom
requiring banks to insulate their core lending divisions from other, riskier activi-
ties in which the bank may be engaged.44
40. AdamJ. Levitin, In Defense ofBailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435,439 (2011); see alsoJonathan R. Macey&
James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation,
120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1370 (2011) (recognizing that "[p]olicymakers . . . cannot credibly commit to
refrain from supporting large, important financial institutions" and explaining the intractable
nature of the challenge); Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Curbing Risk on Wall Street, NATL AFF.,
Spring 2010, at 20, 21 (acknowledging that bailouts are very often the "most practicable response to
very real threats to the financial system").
41. Levitin, supra note 40, at 439.
42. Id. As Levitin's analysis makes clear, the decision to bail out a failing institution is driven by the
political economy as much as, if not more than, actual economic considerations. Thus, while this
Article focuses on situations where a bailout is justified by reference to the systemic costs of
allowing an institution to fail, there may well be a greater swathe of circumstances where a bailout is
sufficiently predictable to affect creditors' assessments of the riskiness of working with a particular
institution.
43. See BASEL III, supra note 37; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED
FRAMEWORK (2005).
44. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124
Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (Supp. V 2011)) (imposing an array of
new limitations on the ability of commercial banks to engage in proprietary trading and make
certain types of investments); Paul Hannon, UK Sticks With Banking Reforms, WALL ST. J., May
6, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304451104577388041493093010.html
("The U.K. government .. ,. is on track to pass legislation that will protect the retail operations of
banks from the banks' more risky investment-bank activities. .. )
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B. Changing Nature of Banking
While the centrality of banks to a functioning economy has remained con-
stant, the nature of banking has not. Over the last few decades, the number of
commercial banks has fallen by half, the size of the average commercial bank has
more than tripled, securitization has created a secondary market for loans, and
bank activities now extend far beyond relationship lending.4 Central to the fun-
damental changes that have occurred over this period has been a bifurcation of
the banking industry into two fundamentally different types of institutions.4 On
one hand are the community-based banks that provide traditional bank services
like taking deposits and relationship-based lending.47 As recently as 1980, com-
munity banks with assets of less than $1 billion (in 2001 dollars) constituted 97
percent of commercial banks and held the majority of all bank assets.48 On the
other hand are the new complex banks. These banks engage in a wide variety of
financial activities beyond taking deposits and making loans, rely more heavily on
fee-based income, and use more standardized methodologies for evaluating the
creditworthiness of people and firms.49 Complex banks are also central players in
many facets of the "shadow banking system," which has also come to play a cen-
tral role in facilitating the flow of capital in today's financial system. 0 This new
45. Loretta J. Mester, Commentary, Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking System and the
Process ofFinancialIntermediation, 92 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., nos. 1 & 2, 2007,
at 67, 67; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation jfthe U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-
2000: Competition, Consolidation, and IncreasedRisks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215.
46. Robert DeYoung, Safety, Soundness, and the Evolution of the US. Banking Industry, 92 FED. RES.
BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., nos. 1 & 2, 2007, at 41, 51-52; see also Wilmarth, supra note 45, at
254-57.
47. DeYoung, supra note 46, at 41-43; see abAo Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains:A Perspective
on Bank Regulation in a DeregulatoryAge, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 516 (1989) (explaining that
the core of traditional banking lied in the "power to take deposits, [which] ... not only provided
banks with a cheap source of funding, but also enabled banks to build relationships with potential
customers for other bank products, such as lines of credit, mortgages or credit cards . . ., [thereby
allowing banks to provide a] unique cluster of products and services").
48. DeYoung, supra note 46, at 43.
49. FIN. STABILITYOVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 59 (2011) [hereinafter FSOC,
2011 ANNUiAL REPORT] (comparing Chart 5.2.12 and 5.2.13, which demonstrates that
community banks continue to derive a significantly greater proportion of their income from net
interest income while large, complex banks earn relatively more in fees and other ways); Asli
Demirgiy-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, BankActivity and Funding Strategies: The Impact on Risk and
Returns, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 626, 630 (2010) (showing that the proportion of income from fees is
increasing as a proportion of bank income, while net interest income--the traditional source of
income for community banks-is declining on a relative basis); DeYoung, supra note 46, at 53-56.
50. See TOBIAS ADRIAN &ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, FED. RESERVE BANK OFN.Y., STAFF REPORT
No. 559, SHADOW BANKING REGULATION (2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org-
research/staff reports/sr559.pdf (reviewing the literature on shadow banking); Erik F. Gerding,
The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal Origins 6-36 (Aug. 23, 2011) (unpublished
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breed of bank has come to dominate the industry. Even before the Crisis, banks
with more than $10 billion in assets (in 2005 dollars) held 75 percent of banking
assets.5 ' And, as a result of further consolidation precipitated by the Crisis, the
ten largest banks in the United States now hold 77 percent of the industry's do-
mestic assets, and the five largest hold a full 52 percent. 52
One effect of the changing nature of banking is to alter banks' interactions
with one another. Banks have long made short-term loans to other banks, and
the interbank market has thus played an important role in redistributing liquidity
from banks that have it to those in need of it. Nonetheless, traditionally, banks'
main sources of credit risk were the companies and persons to whom they loaned
money and the assets, such as real estate, that served as collateral on those loans.
Today's typical complex bank, by contrast, holds proportionately fewer loans on
its balance sheet, reducing significantly its exposure to such sources of credit risk.
At the same time, they engage in an array of new activities, many of which entail
working with, and thereby increasing exposure to, other banks.s1
A typical complex bank will often have myriad relationships with other
banks, including as a counterparty on swaps and other ongoing transactions, as a
lender, as a depositor of cash in the other institution, and as a result of other ar-
rangements, such as pending settlements. Each of these relationships gives the
complex bank a self-interested reason to be concerned about other banks' finan-
cial wellbeing. As explained by one of the leading complex banks, J.P. Morgan:
Financial services institutions are interrelated as a result of market-
making, trading, clearing, counterparty, [and] other relationships. The
Firm [J.P. Morgan] routinely executes transactions with counterparties
in the financial services industry, including brokers and dealers, com-
mercial banks, investment banks, mutual and hedge funds, and other
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816 (providing a comprehensive definition
of the shadow banking system and its structure).
51. Mester, supra note 45, at 67; see also FSOC, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 69 chart
5.2.38 (graphically depicting the rapid decline in industry assets held by small and medium-sized
banks and the correspondent increase in the assets held by the largest banks).
52. Tom C. Frost, The Big Danger With Big Banks, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2012, at A15; Editorial,
Banking Run Amok L Less Likely a Year After Dodd-Frank- View, BLOOMBERG NEWS July 17,
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-17/banking-run-amok-is-less-likely-a-year-
after-dodd-frank-view.html.
53. DUFFIE, supra note 29, at 4 (treating complex banks as a "distinct class," and recognizing that
they differ from traditional banks in a number of regards, including that "[tihey typically act as
intermediaries in the markets for securities, repurchase agreements, securities lending, and [OTC]
derivatives," "[t]hey are prime brokers to hedge funds and provide asset management services," and
"[t]hey may also act as investment banks"); SHELAGH HEFFERNAN, MODERN BANKING 41-99
(2005) (providing a thorough description of the new activities banks have undertaken in recent
decades).
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institutional clients. Many of these transactions expose the Firm to
credit risk in the event of a default by the counterparty or client. The
Firm [also] provid[es] clearing, custodial and prime brokerage services
for financial services companies . . . , all of which can increase the
Firm's operational and litigation costs [should the other firm fail].54
Additionally, the one source of interbank exposure that predates the recent trans-
formation in banking-that arising from short-term loans-has also increased in
recent decades.ss As a result, other banks often are a primary source of credit risk
for today's complex banks, and complex banks invest significant resources moni-
toring and disciplining other banks."
Despite this rise in interbank activity and discipline, the phenomenon has
received little attention in the literature on market discipline. The next Subpart
considers why.
C. Background on Market Discipline
The notion that markets have the potential to discipline banks and that
regulators should promote such discipline is well established. As recognized by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, "market discipline has the po-
tential to reinforce capital regulation and other supervisory efforts to promote
safety and soundness in banks and financial systems."57 Many of the benefits of
market discipline are those that arise from markets generally. Rather than rely-
ing on a single person or regulator's assessment of a bank's risk exposures, market
discipline entails multiple actors, each making independent assessments and tak-
ing actions on the basis of their findings. This is particularly valuable in light of
the inherently limited capacity of regulators to identify and respond to all of the
risks to which a bank may be exposed.
Most academics and policymakers interested in market discipline approach
the issue by looking at a typical bank's balance sheet and assessing whether and
to what degree each identifiable category of stakeholder-depositors, other debt
54. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter J.P.
Morgan Annual Report 20111.
55. HEFFERNAN, supra note 53, at 66 (describing the "very rapid" growth of interbank activity, with
interbank claims rising from $1.5 trillion in 1983 to $11.1 trillion in 2000, over half of which took
the form of loans).
56. See infra Part II.A.
57. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: PILLAR 3 (MARKET
DISCIPLINE), SUPPORTING DOCIMENTTO THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 1 (2001).
58. E.g., Roe, supra note 10, at 589 (explaining the importance of market discipline as lying in the fact
that "prudential regulation will [inevitably] be imperfect, because of the standard debilities of
government actors and because of the potential for capture by the regulated").
1277Interbank Discipline
holders, equity holders, and the like-has an incentive to monitor and restrain
the bank's risk taking.s It is often noted, for example, that as a result of deposit
insurance, most depositors have little incentive to monitor bank risk taking.60
Because such analyses generally focus on ways to improve market discipline, they
often result in calls for banks to issue subordinated debt (or, more recently, debt
that converts into equity), reasoning that the subordinated debt holders will have
the right incentive to monitor and discipline bank risk taking.' There have also
been a number of proposals to improve market discipline by modifying the de-
posit insurance scheme to give depositors greater incentives to monitor and re-
spond to bank risk taking. 62 The other important strand in the literature on
market discipline focuses on disclosure. Recognizing that market participants
will impose meaningful discipline only to the extent that they can accurately as-
sess the risks to which a bank is exposed, regulators require banks to disclose
information intended to facilitate market discipline. Academics have made a
number of innovative proposals for ways to modify disclosure requirements to
improve the quality of the discipline the market imposes.63
59. E.g., PETER J. WALLISON, BACK FROM THE BRINK: A PRACTICAL PLAN FOR PRIVATIZING
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND STRENGTHENING OUR BANKS AND THRIFTS 2-3 (1990); Elena
Cubillas et al., Banking Crises and Market Disciline: International Evidence, 36 J. BANKING & FIN.
2285 (2012); Douglas D. Evanoff, Prferred Sources ofMarket Discipline, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 347,
350 (1993); Douglas D. Evanoff et al., Enhancing Market Disctline in Banking: The Role qf
Subordinated Debt in Financial Regulatory Reform, 63 J. ECON. & Bus. 1 (2011); Forssback, supra
note 26; Eric J. Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, 16 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 311 (1997); William Poole, MoralHazard The Long-Lasting Legacy fBailouts,
RN. ANALYSTS J., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 17, 21 (advocating subordinated debt); Macey & Garrett,
supra note 26, at 215; Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A Capital
Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195 (2000).
60. Forssbceck, supra note 26.
61. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank Contingent Capital and the Need for
Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 passim (2011) (arguing that
banks should be required to issue "contingent capital," that is, debt that converts to equity);
Evanoff, supra note 59, at 355-59 (arguing for "increased reliance . .. on subordinated debt
holders" as the best way to increase the efficacy of market discipline); Poole, supra note 59, at 22-
23; Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, Why and How to Design a Contingent
Convertible Debt Requirement (Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id= 1815406.
62. WALLISON, supra note 59, at 2-3; Macey & Garrett, supra note 26.
63. E.g., Robert P. Bartlett III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293 (2012) (describing
the disclosure requirements currently imposed on U.S. banks and calling for particular types of
disclosure requirements as a means of improving market discipline); Albert J. Boro, Jr., Comment,
Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behavior, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 431 (1986)
(advocating the value of disclosure); Jose A. Lopez, Disclosure as a Supervisory Tool Pillar 3 ofBasel
II, Fed. Reserve Bank S.F. Econ. Letter, Aug. 1, 2003, at 1, 1 ("The principle underlying Pillar 3
is that improved public disclosure of relevant information should enhance market discipline and
hence its potential usefuilness to bank supervisors.").
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There are some notable exceptions to this stylized account of the literature
on market discipline. Mark Roe, for example, has explicitly recognized that banks
and other financial institutions should be particularly adept at imposing disci-
pline on other banks.64 Roe's analysis, however, focuses solely on financial insti-
tutions as counterparties to derivative transactions, leading him to argue that
special protections the U.S. Bankruptcy Code grants such parties gut their eco-
nomic incentive to meaningfully discipline one another.6 Other scholars have
also recognized that banks may be uniquely effective as monitors of other banks,
but most similarly suggest that some policy change is required to give banks ad-
equate incentives to monitor and discipline one another.66 A related limitation
is that many pieces in this vein were written at the early stages of the transfor-
mation in banking, and thus they necessarily fail to appreciate the full range and
magnitude of relationships connecting today's complex banks. 7
While interested in many of the same benefits long associated with market
discipline, this Article takes a different approach to the topic, one that comple-
ments, rather than challenges, much of the existing literature.6 ' As an initial
matter, the Article is less concerned with trying to figure out how to improve
market discipline than with drawing attention to a meaningful source of disci-
pline the market is already imposing. More importantly, in focusing on the role
64. Roe, supra note 10, at 555-57.
65. Id at 541-42.
66. E.g., Charles W. Calomiris, Blueprintsfor aNew GlobalFinancialArchitecture, in INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION 259, 270-72 (Leonardo
Auemhermier ed., 2003) (proposing that banks be required to issue debt that must be held by other
reputable banks); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industy
Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 411 (2011) (arguing for the creation of formal self-regulatory
organizations based on banks' presumed efficacy at monitoring one another).
67. E.g., David G. Oedel, Pivate Interbank Discipline, 16 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POLY 327, 330 (1993)
(suggesting that "private interbank discipline is a rare phenomenon in the United States," but that it
is one that has a long history, and providing examples); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole,
Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT, &BANKING 733 (1996) (providing
theoretical support for the capacity of banks to monitor each other but focusing on short-term
interbank loans as the primary source of credit exposure).
68. The other body of literature related to this Article is that focused on the interbank lending market.
Certain contributions to that literature are relevant and are examined further below. See infa Part
III.A. For the most part, however, that literature tends to focus on short-term loans among banks
and the role of the interbank market in transmitting liquidity. See, e.g., Franklin Allen et al.,
Interbank Market Liquidity and Central Bank Intervention, 56J. MONETARY ECON. 639 (2009);
Xavier Freixas et al., Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank,
32J. MONEY, CREDIT, &BANKING 611 (2000); Viral V. Acharya et al., Imperfect Competition in
the Interbank Marketfor Liquidity as a Rationalefor CentralBanking (INSEAD Working Paper No.
2011/41/FIN, 2011); Franklin Allen et al., Transmission ofBank Liquidity Shocks in Loan and
Deposit Markets: The Role oflnterbank Borrowing and Market Monitoring (Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr.
Working Paper 10-28, 2012).
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that banks play in disciplining other banks, it makes two moves that are atypical
in the literature. First, the Article suggests that we should look past the nature
of a stakeholder's claim in a bank to consider the nature of the stakeholder. Se-
cond, it suggests that we should consider a stakeholder's aggregate exposure to
a bank when assessing that stakeholder's incentive to monitor and discipline a
banks risk taking.
There are drawbacks to shifting away from the established paradigm. One
rationale underlying the tendency to focus on an identifiable class of stakeholders
is that the degree of governmental and other protections vary depending on the
nature of a stakeholder's interest in a bank. As just discussed, depositors are pre-
sumed to impose little discipline to the extent their interests are protected by an
explicit government guarantee. Similarly, many counterparties are protected by
certain preferences under the Bankruptcy Code and may benefit from further
contractual protections. 9 Using a bank's aggregate economic exposure to another
bank as a proxy for its economic interest in that bank's financial wellbeing elides
these (at times, quite significant) distinctions.
At the same time, the proposed approach offers a number of advantages.
Most importantly, it allows us to identify a meaningful source of market disci-
pline that prevailing paradigm fails to capture. Focusing on a bank's aggregate
credit exposure to another bank reveals that the magnitude of its economic inter-
est in that bank's financial wellbeing is far greater than one would expect from
looking at any individual source of exposure. This move is justified by the fact
that banks themselves increasingly consider and seek to control their aggregate
credit exposure to other individual banks, and soon will be required to do so."
Thus, aggregate exposures provide a reasonable, even if imperfect, proxy for
banks' economic exposures to one another. Additionally, because of operational
and other risks arising from their interconnectedness, banks may have reasons to
monitor other banks apart from their credit exposures to those banks. Yet
another advantage of focusing on banks rather than a particular stakeholder class
69. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(17), (b)(27), 560 (2006) (providing derivatives and repurchase
agreement counterparties the right to liquidate collateral in their possession). For firther infor-
mation about the protections given to counterparties when the financial institution facing failure is
a bank, see RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 714-15 (4th ed. 2009).
70. Lending Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,265, 37,268 (proposed June 21, 2012) (to be codified at 12
CEFR. pts. 32, 159, 160); Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements
for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012).
71. See infta Part IIIB.
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is that banks, as banks, may have institutional advantages that make them more
effective disciplinarians than other market participants.72
Finally, and in connection with the above, this Article's focus on interbank
discipline helps demonstrate that the effects of market discipline are not solely
positive from a social welfare perspective. While this has been recognized with
respect to stockholders, the possibility that market discipline could create ex
ante incentives that increase systemic risk has been less appreciated with re-
spect to other stakeholders. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, for
example, advocates market discipline precisely because it believes that "[mlarket
discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe,
sound and efficient manner."73 Close examination of interbank discipline casts
doubt on whether this assumption always holds.74 Having established why in-
terbank discipline may merit attention, the next Part considers the role that it
plays in financial markets today.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERBANK DISCIPLINE
This Part looks at three components which collectively suggest that banks
play a meaningful role disciplining other banks: (a) an economic incentive to do
so, (b) risk management systems that enable banks to monitor their exposure to
other banks and to meaningfully assess the creditworthiness of those banks, and
(c) mechanisms through which banks can alter their behavior in ways that affect
the disciplined bank when its risk profile changes. The claim throughout is not
that banks are perfect disciplinarians. There are numerous indications that they
are not. Rather, the aim of this Part is to establish that interbank discipline is
sufficiently meaningful to merit consideration as we try to determine how best to
allocate inherently finite resources. It concludes with a brief discussion of the
relevance of the Crisis.
A. Incentives
As banking has evolved, so has the numerosity and magnitude of a typical
complex bank's relationships with other banks. Until recently, regulation, or
lack thereof, facilitated the growth of interbank exposures. While regulators
have long imposed limitations on a bank's capacity to become overly exposed to a
particular firm, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a leading
72. See infra Part lIIA.
73. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 57, at 1.
74. Infra Part IIB.
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bank regulator, construed those limits not to apply to loans between banks start-
ing in 1963."s Other regulations applicable to banks, specifically the risk-
weighted capital adequacy requirements set forth in the accords issued by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, contributed to the tendency of banks
to become more interconnected by according loans to other banks an exception-
ally low risk weighting.1 Regulations have been adopted since that time to limit
interbank lending, but the standard limits did not apply when the loans were to a
bank that was adequately capitalized, a limitation revealed to have limited bite by
the Crisis." Moreover, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, these limits applied solely
to loans and similar transactions, thus failing to incorporate credit risk arising
from repos, reverse repos, securities lending transactions, securities borrowing
transactions, and derivative transactions. The Dodd-Frank Act requires that the
rules on interbank limits be revised to include these additional sources of credit
risk." It also places new limitations on interbank exposures and authorizes reg-
ulators to impose more stringent limitations than the Act requires. Nonetheless,
the new regulations have not yet been finalized and remain the subject of ongo-
ing resistance by leading banks.79 As a result, banks may have credit exposures to
one another in excess of their credit exposures to other types of firms, and the
limitations that will be imposed on interbank exposures remains uncertain.
Publicly available information about banks' risk exposures reflects the mag-
nitude of interbank activity. As both Bank of America and Goldman Sachs have
stated, "While our activities expose us to many different industries and coun-
terparties, we routinely execute a high volume of transactions with counterpar-
ties engaged in financial services activities. . . . This has resulted in significant
credit concentration with respect to [this industry]."80
75. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 69, at 302.
76. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 43; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPI-
TAL STANDARDS (1988).
77. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 308, 12 U.S.C. § 371b-2
(2006); 12 C.F.R. pt. 206 (2011).
78. Lending Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,265, 37,265 (proposed June 21, 2012) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 32, 159, 160); Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements
for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012).
79. Tom Braithwaite, Banks Urge Fed Retreat on Credit Exposure, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2012, 9:33
PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6a789456-871d-11el-865d-00144feab49a.html (describing in-
dustry resistance).
80. The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 27 (Feb. 28, 2012) [hereinafter
Goldman Sachs Annual Report 2011]; Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10-
11 (Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Bank ofAm. Corp. Annual Report 2011]. To be sure, until recent-
ly, Goldman Sachs was an investment bank, not a commercial bank. Today, however, all the firms
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The actual figures are striking. For example, 28 percent of Citigroup's
corporate loan portfolio-a portfolio that exceeds its aggregate consumer loan
portfolio, including home loans and credit cards-consists of loans or commit-
ments to banks, investment banks or other financial institutions." Citigroup's
next most significant areas of exposure are governments and central banks (at 12
percent) and petroleum (at 5 percent). 2 Finance companies, including but not
limited to banks, have accounted for 29 percent to 37 percent of the Goldman
Sachs' total credit exposure every year from 2009 through 2011, the only years for
which they have provided such information. J.P. Morgan, which remains very
active in providing traditional services to consumers, similarly has exceptionally
significant credit exposures to other banks and finance companies. At the end
of 2011, J.P. Morgan's aggregate credit exposure to banks and other financial
institutions was over $71 billion, and that figure exceeds $130 billion if other
types of finance companies are included.8 Economic exposures of this magni-
tude provide these banks with a strong economic incentive to ensure that the ex-
posures do not result in correspondent losses.
Significantly, the examples provided are representative of the exposures of
most leading complex banks. The Annual Reports on Form 10-K filed by Bank
of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan & Co., the Goldman Sachs Group, and
Morgan Stanley for the preceding five years reveal that finance companies (in-
cluding, but not limited to, banks) are the top industry exposure the majority of
the time and are consistently near the top even when not first.ss Other leading
sources of credit risk include real estate, government (including central banks),
and to a lesser degree, health care, consumer products, and services and energy.8 6
that had been the leading investment banks are regulated as banks and such banks are among the
"complex banks" here described. See infra Part IV.A.
81. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 114 (Feb. 25, 2011).
82. Id.
83. Calculated using data from the Annual Reports on Form 10-K filed by Goldman Sachs Group for
each of the relevant years. Supporting data on file with author and available for review.
84. J.P. Morgan Annual Report 2011, supra note 54, at 264.
85. Based on data disclosed in Annual Reports on Form 10-K filed between 2007 and 2011, inclusive,
by Bank ofAmerica Corp., Goldman Sachs Grp., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, and
Wells Fargo & Co. Other leading financial institutions, like MetLife, Inc., do not disclose this
type of information, and the information for the banks referenced varies in depth. Different banks
use different methodologies and categorization schemes, so finance companies, as used here, are
sometimes a composite. Also, many banks separate their consumer and commercial divisions for
reporting purposes. For banks that separate, the information here reported is based solely on the
commercial portion of their operations. Supporting data and additional information on file with
author and available for review.
86. J.P. Morgan Annual Report 2011, supra note 54.
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Recently released information about the credit exposures between particular
banks provides further evidence that banks have significant economic interests
in the wellbeing of other banks. While no individual bank discloses this infor-
mation, banks are in the process of resisting a proposal by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) to prevent the largest
complex banks from having credit exposure to any single counterparty in excess
of ten percent of the bank's regulatory capital." To bolster their claims regard-
ing the unreasonableness of the proposed rule, trade associations representing
the banking industry have compiled and released information demonstrating
how far current practices deviate from the proposed standard." Preliminary re-
sults of a study of interbank exposures, which used data from thirteen banking
organizations, revealed "100 exposures to 29 unique counterparties in excess of
the applicable credit limit."89 Moreover, the study found that "the average coun-
terparty exposure for those excesses would be 248% of the applicable credit lim-
it."o These figures demonstrate that the leading complex banks have significant
economic exposures to other individual complex banks. To emphasize just how
drastically the proposed rule would alter bank activity, the trade associations as-
sert that the "10% credit limit imposed on major covered companies-and even
the 25% credit limit imposed on all covered companies [mandated by the Dodd-
Frank Act]-may severely restrict legitimate and economically desirable credit-
related business," and "[t]o comply with the proposed requirements, the provi-
sion of some credit products and services may have to be reduced significantly.""
While the parties making these assertions clearly are not disinterested and ob-
jective, the banks and those lobbying on their behalf would have little reason to
undertake such efforts if complex banks did not typically have credit exposures
to one another far in excess of the proposed limits. A bank with even a 10 percent
exposure to another bank could face incredibly significant difficulties if the other
87. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77
Fed. Reg. 594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012). The 10 percent limitation would apply to banks with
assets in excess of $500 billion. For further information about efforts by complex banks to resist the
imposition of the proposed limitation, see Akshat Tewary, CEOs'Meeing With TarulloP Big Banks'
Version ofMay Day, AM. BANKER (May 2, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/
bankthink/Tarullo-meeting-Federal-Reserve-counterparty-limit-1048954-1.htm.
88. Clearing House Letter to Fed., supra note 13, annex C; see also Braithwaite, supra note 79
(describing industry resistance to the proposed counterparty exposure limits). All of these figures
appear to be calculated using the methodology the Federal Reserve proposed for calculating
exposures; a number of banks and other commenters, including the Clearing House, claim this
approach overstates actual risk exposures.
89. Clearing House Letter to Fed., supra note 13, at 10.
9 0. Id.
91. Idannex C,atC-1.
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bank failed, suggesting that these bank-to-bank exposures give banks a powerful,
self-interested reason to monitor and respond to risk taking by other banks.
There are limitations inherent in the data available, arising in significant
part from the lack of directly relevant disclosure requirements.92 Combined with
the related challenges of limited historical data and banks' various and evolving
methodologies for measuring credit risk from sources other than loans, the ability
to do historical analyses and cross-bank comparisons is limited. At the same
time, the limited nature of the data may itself support this Article's main claim.
Banks cannot disclose what they do not themselves know. The tendency of
banks to provide increasingly thorough information about their credit exposure
despite the lack of any change in the applicable requirements may indicate that
it is only recently that banks' risk management systems have become sufficiently
sophisticated for them to accurately measure and aggregate credit exposures.93
Moreover, banks' self-interested concern with the financial wellbeing of
other banks goes beyond the credit exposures captured in the preceding
measures. Banks, for example, frequently act as market makers and otherwise
trade in a range of securities and other instruments.94 This creates settlement
risk, as one party will often have to deliver the asset or payment before receipt of
the consideration owed by the other side (creating a risk of loss if the other party
fails in the interim).9 5 As one treatise explains, settlement risk is "especially"
problematic in "interbank markets because the volume of interbank payments is
extremely high," particularly when viewed "in relation to the capital set aside by
each bank." 6 Recall as well that complex banks often also provide "clearing,
custodial and prime brokerage services for financial services companies."97 The-
se activities pose relatively limited credit risk but, they give rise to potential "op-
erational and litigation costs," should the financial institution for whom the
92. The primary applicable disclosure requirements are set forth in "Guide 3," applicable to bank
holding companies. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INDUSTRY GUIDES 6-13 (2012) (the
pertinent industry guide under the Securities Act of 1933); id. at 37 (the pertinent industry guide
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Guide 3 and other disclosure requirements applicable
to banks have, however, evolved far less than banking has changed over the past three decades, and
the lack of more detailed information regarding counterparty and other interbank exposures is but
one way that the current disclosure requirements potentially fail to give investors sufficient
information to evaluate banks. See Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, 'Pure
Information," and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012) (describing the
applicable disclosure requirements and their limitations).
93. See infra Part IJ.B (addressing the importance of this development to interbank discipline).
94. E.g., J.P. Morgan Annual Report 2011, supra note 54, at 10.
95. LIEFFERNAN, supra note 53, at 106-07.
9 6. Id.
97. J.P. Morgan Annual Report 2011, supra note 54, at 10.
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services are provided face financial distress.98 Today's complex banks thus not
only have significant credit exposure to other banks but also have other self-
interested reasons to be concerned about the financial wellbeing of other banks.
B. Risk Management Systems
Having established that banks have the requisite incentives, the next ques-
tion is whether banks have the tools necessary to monitor other banks and to
make meaningful assessments of the risks to which those banks are exposed.
Evidence suggests that they do, and that their capacity in both of these regards
is likely to continue to improve in the years ahead.99
Risk management is a multitiered undertaking for most banks. A closer
look at J.P. Morgan's system for understanding and limiting its credit exposures
illustrates. The firm has a chief risk officer who oversees its risk management
program, which "works in partnership with the business segments in identifying
and aggregating exposures across all lines of business."' 0 J.P. Morgan also has
extensive "policies and practices . . . to ensure credit risks are assessed accurately,
approved properly, monitored regularly and managed actively at both the trans-
action and portfolio levels."' 0' This includes monitoring the firm's "[wjholesale
credit risk [discussed above] regularly at an aggregate portfolio, industry and in-
dividual counterparty basis with established concentration limits that are re-
viewed and revised, as deemed appropriate by management, typically on an
annual basis."' 02 The firm's "[ijndustry and counterparty limits" are "measured in
terms of exposure and economic credit risk capital," and "are subject to stress-
based loss constraints."103 As these policies make clear, J.P. Morgan has systems
in place to understand its aggregate economic exposure to other banks, and it
manages those exposures at multiple levels.
J.P. Morgan has also instituted a number of governance mechanisms de-
signed to promote effective risk management. At the highest levels, the bank's
"CEO is responsible for setting the overall risk appetite of the Firm." The firm
also has two committees of its board of directors-the Risk Policy Committee
and the Audit Committee-which play active roles in monitoring the firm's risk
management policies and the implementation thereof. To ensure that the poli-
98. Id
99. Part IILA, infa, provides additional insight into why banks may be particularly effective as monitors
and disciplinarians of other banks.
100. J.P. Morgan Annual Report 2011, supra note 54, at 133.
10 1. Id
102. Idatl134.
103. Id
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cies set by senior management are carried out and that senior management is
informed when issues arise, the firm has instituted an internal governance re-
gime involving multiple layers of committees designed to promote regular com-
munication between the firm's Risk Working Group and each of the firm's other
divisions. 104 Overlaying these specific mechanisms, the firm claims to promote
"a culture of risk awareness and personal responsibility ... where collaboration,
discussion, escalation and sharing of information is encouraged."' 5 What is
most remarkable about J.P. Morgan's sophisticated, resource-intensive risk man-
agement system is that it is not very remarkable. J.P. Morgan has a long history
of being at the forefront of credit risk management, so it may have an exception-
ally strong risk management system in practice. Nonetheless, the description
here is consistent with the risk management regimes in place at most complex
banks.106
There are also external checks on the robustness of banks' risk manage-
ment systems. Most notably, a primary aim of bank examiners is to ensure that
the banks they oversee have adequate risk management systems. With respect
to a bank's credit-administration procedures, for example, the Federal Reserve
(another leading bank examiner) expects its examiners to determine whether the
bank regularly reviews the creditworthiness of its counterparties, "whether man-
agement has demonstrated an ability to identify downgrades in creditworthiness
between reviews," whether "credit-risk-management staff demonstrate an ability
to work out of positions with counterparties whose credit quality has deteriorat-
ed," "whether management considered the full range of exposures when estab-
lishing capital-at-risk exposures," and whether "limits are in place for
counterparties before transacting a deal," among other things.' To facilitate
such exhaustive reviews, the regulatory scheme gives bank examiners inside ac-
cess to a bank's documentation and personnel.108 These reviews are meant to be
sufficiently robust to enable an examiner to reach meaningful conclusions about
104. Id. at 125-26 (including organizational chart and accompanying description).
105. Id. at 125.
106. See Bank of Am. Corp. Annual Report 2011, supra note 80, at 68-71; Citigroup Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 66-67 (Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Citigroup Inc. Annual Report 2011];
Wells Fargo &Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 46-84 (Feb. 28,2012); Goldman Sachs Annual
Report 2011, supra note 80, at 82-86; Morgan Stanley, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 102-06
(Feb. 29, 2012); U.S. Bancorp, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 34-54 (Feb. 23, 2012); HSBC
USA Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 131-33 (Feb. 27, 2012); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp.,
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 57-59 (Feb. 28,2012).
107. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, DIvISION OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION, TRADING AND CAPITAL-MARKETS ACTIVITIES MANUAL § 2020.3, at 1
(Supp. 14 2011) [hereinafter CAPITAL-MARKETs ACTIVITIES MANUAL].
108. See infa Part IV.B and sources cited therein.
1287Interbank Discipline
each bank's risk management systems. Among other things, the Federal Reserve
expects its examiners to "determine if the institution's credit-risk-measurement
system has been correctly implemented and adequately measures the institu-
tion's credit risks," "determine if the institution has implemented adequate poli-
cies and procedures that are sufficiently calibrated to the risk profiles of
particular types of counterparties and instruments," and "ensure the comprehen-
siveness, accuracy, and integrity of management information systems that ana-
lyze credit exposures." In short, bank examiners are expected to inspect-and
second-guess the efficacy of-every aspect of a bank's risk management system.
While not a perfect fail-safe, the very process of requiring a bank to explain and
justify the adequacy of its risk management system to an inquisitive and powerful
third party provides an important additional check on the robustness of such sys-
tems.110
To be sure, banks do not do a perfect job of identifying and accurately as-
sessing the magnitude of risks to which other banks are exposed. Banks all too
often fail to accurately assess their own risk exposures, as illustrated all too well by
J.P. Morgan's "London Whale" debacle-a series of transactions intended to be
part of the bank's efforts to manage its risk that resulted in nearly $6 billion in
losses and forced the bank to admit to a "material weakness" in its internal con-
trols for failing to catch inflated valuations that the traders placed on the
transactions."' Market participants-like regulators-at times make mistakes.
Nonetheless, the analysis here demonstrates that banks devote substantial re-
sources to monitoring and responding to risk taking at other banks and financial
institutions. In so doing, they likely develop a meaningful, even if flawed and
incomplete, understanding of other banks' risk exposures.
C. Imposing Discipline
The third and final component supporting the power of interbank disci-
pline is a mechanism through which a revised assessment by one bank (the
disciplining bank) of the risks posed by another bank (the disciplined bank) alter
the disciplining bank's activities in a way that affects the disciplined bank.
The disciplined bank need not know it is being disciplined, but it must feel the
109. CAPITAL-MARKETS ACTIVITIES MANUAL, supra note 107, § 2020.2, at 1.
110. For firther discussion of the ability of banks to make meaningful assessments of the creditworthiness
of other banks, see inftaPart III.A.
111. Dan Fitzpatrick & Matthias Rieker, Whale's Tail Hits Buyback, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2012, at
C1; Dan Fitzpatrick & Gregory Zuckerman, 'Whale' Tab Hits $58 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 13,
2012, at Bi.
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effect. As a general matter, a stakeholder that becomes concerned about a bank's
risk exposures can respond in one of two ways: It can exercise contractual, voting,
or other rights it may possess to try to change the bank's activities or it can reduce
its economic exposure to the bank. Banks discipline each other almost exclusive-
ly through the latter of these two mechanisms. Even that process, however, is
not straightforward. This Subpart focuses on credit risk and then considers other
reasons, and mechanisms, for interbank discipline.
The primary way that banks respond to the perceived riskiness of other
banks is through credit limits. As a disciplining bank's assessment of the risk
profile of another bank changes, the maximum exposure the disciplining bank is
willing to assume with respect to that bank should change accordingly. Limits
are usually set at multiple levels, including firm-wide limits and limits on the ag-
gregate credit exposure that might arise from a particular division or in connec-
tion with a particular type of transaction.112 As the disciplining bank revises its
assessment of the risks posed by the disciplined bank, it revises these limits ac-
cordingly and makes corresponding changes in its actual credit exposures to that
bank. A disciplining bank can reduce its actual credit exposure to the disci-
plined bank by refusing to extend new loans or enter into new agreements with
the bank, terminating existing arrangements, and seeking to exit current ar-
rangements by assigning them to a third party."3 Holding everything else con-
stant, the effect should be to reduce the disciplined bank's operations and
operating revenue. While the magnitude of this effect may be small when
viewed in isolation, the aggregate effect of numerous banks making similar
changes in their dealings with the disciplined bank can be significant.114
The analysis, however, cannot end there because disciplining banks can and
do use other means for reducing credit exposures. The disciplining bank often
will, for example, seek to further reduce its exposure indirectly through hedg-
ing. A credit default swap (CDS) effectively enables a bank (or any other firm)
to insure itself against loss should a specified firm fail. By entering into CDS
referencing the disciplined bank, a disciplining bank may reduce (or eliminate)
its effective exposure to that bank. Doing so imposes a cost on the disciplining
bank, as it must pay a premium, commonly referred to as the spread, in exchange
for the insurance policy. Hedging also affects the disciplined bank. Market par-
ticipants and regulators alike recognize CDS spreads as indicative of a bank's fi-
112. See, e.g., CAPITAL-MARKETs ACTIVITIES1MANUAL, supra note 107, § 2020.2, at 9-10.
113. Idat10.
114. See DUFFIE, supra note 29, at 1-3 (identifying as a typical early stage in the demise of a complex
bank, and one that contributes to its demise, the growing unwillingness of counterparties to enter
into new arrangements with it and their assignment of outstanding arrangements to third parties).
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nancial wellbeing."' When the disciplining bank hedges its exposure, it increas-
es demand for CDS referencing the disciplined bank, increasing the spread on
CDS referencing the bank, and thus sending a signal that the bank is marginally
riskier than it appeared to be prior to the hedge." 6 Increases in CDS spreads
often also impose direct costs on disciplined banks by increasing the interest a
bank must pay on short-term and other loans.'
Yet another way that banks reduce their effective credit exposure to other
banks is through collateral arrangements. To the extent an exposure is collateral-
ized, a bank reduces its potential loss on the bankruptcy of the other bank by the
value of the collateral. This protection can be particularly valuable for banks
when acting as counterparties to derivative transactions because of special protec-
tions provided by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code."8
Like hedging, using collateral to reduce effective exposure entails transac-
tion costs and often imposes additional costs on both banks. When a bank is re-
quired to post collateral, the bank loses the ability to use the committed asset for
other productive purposes. To the extent that a bank is required to post high-
quality, highly liquid collateral, as is often the case, the bank faces proportionate-
ly greater liquidity constraints and has fewer liquid assets with which to pursue
other opportunities. Even a contingent commitment to post collateral can be
costly for a bank, as the disciplined bank must alter its operations in a way that
ensures it will have adequate satisfactory collateral in the event that the contin-
gency arises." 9 Correspondingly, the disciplined bank required to post collateral
may demand better terms to compensate for these disadvantages, imposing po-
tential costs on the disciplining bank. The disciplining bank also faces challenges
with respect to monitoring and enforcing contingent rights to demand collateral.
A final challenge is that the value of collateral can change. Even collateral that
appears to be high quality and highly liquid (as most AAA-rated, mortgage-
115. CHRISTIAN WEISTROFFER, DEUTSCHE BANK, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: HEADING
TOWARDS A MORE STABLE SYSTEM 9 (2009), available at http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/
DBRINTERNETEN-PROD/PROD000 0000252032/Credit+defiult+swapso3A+Heading+
towards+a+more+stable+system.pdf ("CDS spreads serve as an important source of information for
private banks, central banks, supervisors and international organisations alike.").
116. See DUFFIE, supra note 29, at 1-2 (describing how signals can lead to market gossip).
117. See Tony Boyd, Rating Agencies at Risk, BUs. SPECTATOR (Dec. 9, 2008, 12:29 PM),
http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2008/12/9/interest-rates/rating-agencies-risk
(describing the increasing use of credit default swap (CDS) spreads as a reference for setting
interest rates on loans).
118. Roe, supra note10, at 547-48.
119. E.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Testy Conflict With Goldman Helped Push ALI.. to
Edge, N.Y.'PIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at Al.
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backed securities appeared to be before the Crisis) may prove to be otherwise,
and true high quality assets may be in short supply.' 20
In practice, a bank seeking to reduce its exposure to another bank often uses
all three of these mechanisms in varying degrees. At time, banks will also seek
other forms of compensation for assuming extra credit risk, like demanding more
favorable terms. A disciplining bank also may utilize other mechanisms, like
guarantees, to reduce the probability of loss should a bank to which it is exposed
fail. The extent that a disciplining bank relies on each of these mechanisms in-
volves complex cost-benefit tradeoffs. Intrafirm dynamics, like the processes a
bank uses for setting aggregate exposure limits, imposing limits with respect to
particular transaction types and divisions, and the mechanisms it uses to enforce
such limitations, can further alter this calculus.
The key for the analysis here is that a bank cannot reduce its exposure to
another bank in a way that is costless to both banks. Virtually all actions that the
disciplining bank may take to reduce its credit exposure impose costs on the dis-
ciplined bank and many entail costs for the disciplining bank. Because of the as-
sociated costs, banks do not generally use collateral and other forms of hedging
to eliminate their credit exposure to other banks completely. Data released by
J.P. Morgan, for example, show that the firm hedged between 12 percent and
nearly 20 percent of its exposure to all financial companies in between 2007
and 2011.121 Similarly, at the end of 2011, Citigroup economically hedged 10
percent of its credit exposures to banks and broker-dealers, and 5 percent of its
credit exposure to insurance and special purpose vehicles; those figures were 7
percent and 4 percent, respectively, a year earlier.122 Because disciplining banks
seek to minimize the costs they incur, the majority of these costs should fall on
disciplined banks. Similarly, when a bank changes its activities and risk profile
in a way that makes working with that bank more appealing to other banks, oth-
er banks should respond by increasing their credit limits with respect to that
bank, reducing their reliance on hedging and collateral, and otherwise dealing
with the bank on more favorable terms.
Apart from banks' efforts to manage the credit risk, interbank discipline
can also arise from banks' efforts to manage the other risks that can arise from
interbank dealings. 23 J.P. Morgan's efforts to manage the operational, litiga-
120. E.g., Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007, at 5
(May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
121. Calculated using data from the Annual Reports on Form 10-K filed byJ.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
for the relevant years. Supporting data on file with author and available for review.
122. Citigroup Inc. Annual Report 2011, supra note 106, at 93.
123. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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tion, and other risks arising from its provision of clearing services to other banks
illustrates. As The Wall Street Journal recently reported in the lead article in its
Money & Investing section, J.P. Morgan has undertaken a review of the clearing
services it provides to banks and other financial institutions, with the aim of "di-
aling back services to some clients and severing ties with others."124 Notably, it is
not reducing the services it provides across the board. "[N]et income at the unit
was $463 million in the second quarter" of 2012, 9 percent of the firm's profits
for the quarter. The firm thus has a strong economic interest in not scaling it
back excessively. 125 Instead, the firm is engaging in complex cost-benefit analyses,
which take into account its assessments of the downside risks to which various
firms are exposed, and adjusting its services accordingly.126 The publication and
prominent positioning of the article-even before J.P. Morgan has made any
public announcements about the changes-reflect the economic significance of
such changes for the institutions affected. This is thus yet another example of
interbank discipline.
The preceding three sections collectively describe a system in which banks
are under constant oversight by other banks. Numerous banks, all doing business
with a bank, regularly assess that bank's risk profile. As they do, the disciplining
banks adjust their willingness to work with the disciplined bank and alter their
behavior accordingly. All of these processes are dynamic and iterative, increas-
ing the probability that assessments and responses will increasingly reflect the
disciplined bank's actual risk exposures over time. Further increasing the accura-
cy of the system as a whole is the sheer number of participants. Interbank dis-
cipline is not the product of one bank's assessment of another. Rather, its
power lies in the judgments that many banks constantly make about one another.
These decisions may have only small effects on the disciplined bank, if viewed in
isolation, but can have significant effects in the aggregate. By rewarding banks
that alter their risk profiles in ways that make them attractive from a credit risk
perspective and penalizing those that do the opposite, interbank discipline pro-
vides immediate, material benefits and costs to banks in accordance with their
risk profiles. Interbank discipline thus incents banks to change how they do
business in some significant, and at times troubling, ways.
124. Julie Steinberg et al., JR. Morgan Rankled by Risk-Bank Seeks to Dial Back Some Dealings With
Brokerages, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2012, at C1.
125. Id
126. See supra Part II.A.
1292 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262 (2013)
D. A Note About the Crisis
The Crisis has been viewed by many as evidence of the utter failure of the
market, and hence of the error of relying on market discipline. Even former
chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan expressed "shocked disbelief'
that "the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders' equity" was
not sufficient to prevent the Crisis.127 This sub-Part explains why the Crisis and
other apparent market failures change the lens that we should use for under-
standing market discipline, but do not undermine the importance of understand-
ing and responding to its effects.
The most important reason why the Crisis does not undermine the im-
portance of interbank discipline relates to the appropriate basis for comparison.
If the question is whether banks perfectly monitor other banks, the answer is
clearly no. Bank opacity prevents other banks from developing a perfect un-
derstanding of the risks to which a bank is exposed. Moreover, in light of the
costs associated with obtaining and processing information and the fallibility of
the human beings who carry out risk management on banks' behalf, disciplining
banks would almost certainly fail to incorporate perfect information even if it
were available. To suggest that interbank market discipline merits attention does
not, however, require that banks do a perfect job. Policy choices are inevitably
choices among imperfect alternatives. All of those engaged in monitoring and
assessing bank risk taking-including bank examiners, credit rating agencies,
and other market participants-have regularly failed to identify banks on the
verge of failure and have otherwise erred in their assessments of the risks posed
by particular institutions. Interbank discipline may thus be flawed yet sufficiently
powerful that its effects should be considered in determining how best to allocate
finite government resources. Moreover, recognizing market discipline as signif-
icant need not, and should not, mean abdicating regulatory oversight completely.
So long as the discipline banks impose on one another affects bank risk taking-
and the analysis up to this point supports that conclusion-it merits regulatory
attention.
Separately, the Crisis revealed little that is inconsistent with this Article's
claims regarding the current power and efficacy of interbank discipline. As an
initial matter, most banks' current risk management practices are significantly
more robust than those in place prior to the Crisis. Credit risk management
practices are continually improving in general and the Crisis substantially acceler-
127. The Financial Crisis and the Role ofthe Federal Regulators: Heaing Before the H Comm. on Oversight
& Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 17 (2008) (statement of Dr. Alan Greenspan, former chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board).
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ated this process. Regulatory changes adopted in the wake of the Crisis provide
further impetus for firms to improve their risk management practices. The Fed-
eral Reserve, for example, has proposed new rules designed to ensure the robust-
ness of banks' enterprise risk management systems and has mandated that large
banks have risk management committees. The Financial Stability Oversight
Council has similarly issued recommendations directing senior bank officials to
institute "strong risk-management and reporting structures," and to "establish
clear accountability for failures of risk management."128 To be sure, banks seem
to have been overly lax in their monitoring and disciplining of other banks.
As with other aspects of interbank discipline, the risk that, absent regulatory
intervention, interbank discipline will tend to be cyclical with banks becom-
ing more lax during boom times, is an important consideration in determin-
ing how best to respond to the phenomenon. But it is not a reason to ignore
it. And, having been shaken out of the false lull created by the dearth of
bank failures, banks today are far more attuned to the risks posed by inter-
bank exposures than they were before the Crisis.
There is also reason to believe that many banks had fairly robust risk man-
agement systems already in place. Banks may have grossly overestimated the
strength of the real estate market while underestimating the risks posed by secu-
ritized instruments tied to it, but the Crisis itself cannot be wholly attributed to
flaws in banks' systems for monitoring and managing their exposures to other
banks. Banks' interests and society's interests are not synonymous-government
bailouts benefit banks despite being socially costly.129 To the consternation of
many, the great majority of complex banks survived the Crisis, with many re-
cording substantial profits, and paying out correspondingly sizeable bonuses,
while the rest of the economy only slowly recovered from the myriad challenges
the Crisis created.'3 o
Additionally, some of the most significant developments in the Crisis were
precipitated, in part, by interbank discipline. The failures of Bear Steams and
Lehman Brothers, for example, have been attributed in significant part to other
128. FSOC, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 15; see abAo Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §165(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1429-30 (2 0 10 );
Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77
Fed. Reg. 594,600 (proposedJan. 5, 2012).
129. See infra Part II.B.
130. See, e.g., FSOC, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 58-59 (showing in Chart 5.2.12 that
by the first quarter of 2011, pretax net income for the largest banks was down just 12 percent from
2006 levels); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The Special Master for TARP Executive
Compensation Concludes the Review of Prior Payments (July 23, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg786.aspx (noting large bonuses at banks in the years imme-
dliately after the peak of the financial crisis).
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banks' refusals to provide the troubled banks financing or to engage in other
transactions with them on sufficiently favorable terms.'3 ' Similarly, the collateral
demands that Goldman Sachs made on AIG played a critical role in precipitat-
ing its need for a government bailout. 32 In each instance, it was the market, not
regulators, who identified the relevant firm as troubled and took actions that pe-
nalized it accordingly. These examples illustrate yet another way that unchecked
market-imposed discipline may give rise to socially suboptimal outcomes: It can
be imposed in ways that exacerbate problems rather than prevent them. Yet,
again, such challenges are important factors to consider in determining the ap-
propriate policy responses to interbank discipline, but they are not a reason to ig-
nore its power.' 33
III. BANKS AS DISCIPLINARIANS
This Part looks at the institutional competence and incentives of banks
with respect to the discipline they impose on other banks. It thus moves past
the core aim of this Article-drawing attention to the power of interbank disci-
pline-to the effects of that discipline. In revealing problematic effects of inter-
bank discipline and variability in its efficacy, this Part also illustrates why this
Article advocates a complementarity approach in responding to interbank disci-
pline.
The complementarity approach advocated here shares certain assumptions
with the two approaches generally endorsed by advocates of market discipline,
that is, deregulation and belt-and-suspenders style duplication. It shares the as-
sumption inherent in the deregulatory response that when the market is perform-
ing a task well, we should reduce, perhaps significantly, the regulatory resources
devoted to it. It also shares the pragmatic view underlying the belt-and-
suspenders approach that no regulator or market participant is ever going to be
perfect, and the stability of the financial system is a sufficiently valuable social
good to warrant some duplication. 34  The complementarity approach differs
from these established approaches by suggesting that we should also consider the
131. See Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics ofDealer Banks, 24J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 65-66 (2 01 0 )
(describing banks rapidly withdrawing from transactions with Bear Stearns, for example, through
refusing Bear Steams's novation requests); Bryan Burrough, Bringing Down Bear Stearns, VANITY
FAIR, Aug. 2008, at 106, 151 ("[E]xecutives at both Goldman and Credit Suisse told their traders
to hold up all novation requests dealing with Bear Stearns, pending approval by their credit depart-
ments."); Kate Kelly, The Fall ofBear Stearns: Fear, Rumors Touched OffFatalRun on Bear Stearns,
WALL ST.J., May 28, 2008, at Al.
132. Morgenson & Story, supra note 119.
133. See infta Part IIIB.
134. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 63, at 316; Roe, supra note 10, at 589.
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relative institutional advantages of regulators and market participants in assessing
the significance of interbank discipline on the establishment of regulatory priori-
ties. Two institutional dimensions merit particular attention-competence and
incentives. Competence matters because understanding what banks do well,
and what regulators might do better, sheds light on how best to allocate finite
regulatory resources in light of the discipline the market imposes. Incentives
matter because to the extent there is a disparity between the incentives of
banks, as the relevant market participants, and the activity that would maxim-
ize social welfare, regulatory intervention may be needed to counter the effects of
the disparity or to fill gaps that remain. This Part discusses each of these issues
with respect to the role that banks play in disciplining each other. The next Part
addresses both with respect to regulators.
A. Institutional Competence
The primary reason banks are likely to be effective disciplinarians lies in
the power of economic incentives.' 35 Regulators may lose prestige if they fail,
but bank examiners are rarely fired for making mistakes, and the regulator that
employs them is unlikely to go bankrupt as a result of their errors. The same is
not true for banks. The sheer size of banks' economic exposures to one another
gives them a powerful economic interest in understanding the risks to which
other banks are exposed and protecting themselves as appropriate. Moreover,
one way that risk management has improved in the wake of the Crisis is
through the creation of new mechanisms for ensuring that senior officials play a
more active role in risk management.' 36 As a result, agency costs within banks
that may undermine the efficacy of risk management systems should be more
tightly constrained than they have been in the past.
Closely related to banks' economic incentives to be good disciplinarians is
their capacity to hire the best and the brightest personnel available. Banks are
not subject to constraints in the compensation they can provide, and the high
levels of compensation typical at many banks help them attract exceptionally ca-
135. See Macey & Garrett, supra note 26, at 220 ("The likelihood that regulators are as effective as
private parties at designing methods to control bank risk is slight, because unlike private parties,
regulators do not have their own funds at stake.").
136. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77
Fed. Reg. 594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (requiring large banks to have risk management
committees); FDIC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF MATERIAL Loss
REVIEWS, No. MLR-11-010, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF FDIC SUPERVISION PROGRAM
ENHANCEMENTS:14-16 (2010) (describing changes in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion's (FDJC) policy and procedures adopted to address the role of bank boards and management
in responding to identified weaknesses).
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pable personnel.137 Moreover, some leading banks, like Goldman Sachs, are
known for moving personnel between trading desks and risk management posi-
tions as well as doing the reverse.' 38 Such personnel movements can facilitate
good working relationships between risk management departments and other di-
visions, in addition to further enhancing the ability of banks to attract highly ca-
pable individuals into risk management positions.
Yet another reason that banks may be effective disciplinarians is that they
are analyzing entities that are like themselves. Banks, for example, understand
the financial reporting requirements imposed on banks because they must com-
ply with the same requirements themselves. This gives banks an advantage in
analyzing another bank's financial statements, enabling insights into which fig-
ures are likely to be reliable, which are likely to involve more judgment (and be
subject to gaming), which small changes in a bank's financial position might sig-
nal problems down the line, and other issues. Such insights may be particularly
valuable in light of the numerous judgment calls inherent in the process of finan-
cial reporting for today's complex banks.' 39
A related advantage possessed by banks relative to other market actors is
that as active participants in the same markets, banks often have inside infor-
mation about other banks' activities and exposures. In the years before the Crisis,
for example, underwriters and those involved in packaging mortgages into
mortgage-backed securities likely had a better understanding than most regard-
ing which banks had become the most lax in their underwriting policies and
practices. Similarly, traders in a particular area often have a sense of who is buy-
ing what and on what terms. Such signals can be noisy, particularly because
banks may engage in activities to limit the capacity of third parties to deduce
their trading strategies. Nonetheless, imperfect information is still information and
137. Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the Distribution oflncome, 30 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 284-85 (2010-2011) (describing numerous studies documenting that
bankers often receiver very sizeable compensation packages).
138. E.g., Dominic Elliott, Inside Goldman Sachs Risk Management, FIN. NEWS, Apr. 19, 2010,
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-04-19/inside-goldman-sachs-risk-management
(stating that Goldman Sachs has a "culture of moving traders into risk management positions").
139. See, e.g., Sven Bornemann et al., Are Banks Using Hidden Reserves to Beat Earnings Benchmarks?
Evidence From Germany, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 2403 (2012) (providing evidence suggesting that
banks build hidden reserves which they use to manage earnings); David Enrich &Max Colchester,
EUBanks'Risk in Eyes ofBeholder, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2012, at C1 ("[A] parade of banks ...
intend to increase their capital ratios-a key gauge of their abilities to absorb future losses-partly
by tinkering with the way they assess the riskiness of their assets."); Floyd Norris, Accountants
Misled Us Into Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at B1 (quoting Robert Herz, then chairman of
the Financial Accounting Standards Board, as saying that certain accounting practices resulted in
"important aspects of our entire financial system .. . operating like a Wild West show, [resulting in]
huge unregulated opaque markets").
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may be quite valuable, particularly when coupled with a deep understanding of
the relevant market and considered in light of the fact that banks are notoriously
opaque institutions.14 0
Yet another reason that banks may be particularly effective as disciplinarians
lies in the overlap between the types of judgments required to assess another
bank's riskiness and the types of judgments banks must make in connection with
other aspects of their operations. For example, if a bank has a large commercial
real estate portfolio or makes an aggressive bet on sovereign debt issued by coun-
tries in a particular region, assessing the riskiness of that bank requires a judg-
ment about the strength of the commercial real estate market or the countries
issuing the debt. Banks are already in the business of making these types of
judgment calls and they have strong financial incentives-even apart from their
interbank credit exposures-to ensure that these judgments are as accurate as
possible. This is one of the ways that banks may have advantages relative not just
to other market participants, but relative to bank regulators as well.
The evidence available supports the notion that banks may be effective dis-
ciplinarians. For example, in a study examining the interest rates banks charge
other banks for overnight loans, Craig Furgine finds that "banks with higher
profitability, fewer problem loans, and higher capital ratios pay lower interest
rates."141 The Federal Reserve sets the target for such rates, and the daily average
for the rates that banks charge each other is known as the effective federal funds
rate, but the interest rate that any one bank charges another is determined entire-
ly by the banks involved. Based on his findings, Furgine concludes that the
"price of a federal funds loan reflects, in part, the credit risk of the borrowing in-
stitution . . . suggest[ing] that banks can distinguish credit risk among their peers
and price loan contracts accordingly."142 Similarly, Gara Afonso and her coau-
thors found that immediately following Lehman Brothers's bankruptcy, "large
banks with high percentages of non-performing loans showed drastically reduced
daily borrowing amounts and borrowed from fewer counterparties in the days af-
ter Lehman's bankruptcy."143 Based on that finding and others, they conclude
that their "results lend support to the interpretation that heightened concerns
140. E.g., Donald P. Morgan, Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an OpaqueIndustry, 92 AM. ECON.
REv. 874 (2002).
141. Craig H. Furfine, Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence From the Overnight Federal Funds
Market, 74J. BUS. 33, 54 (2001).
14 2. Id
143. Gara Afonso et al, Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal/Funds Market in the Financial Crisis, 66 J. FIN.
1109, 1110 (2011).
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about counterparty risk reduce[] liquidity and increase[] the cost of finance for
weaker banks."' 44
Spreads on credit default swaps referencing banks provide further evidence
of interbank discipline. The CDS spreads for both Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers went up significantly prior to their respective failures, and CDS spreads
throughout the Crisis demonstrate significant bank-specific variation. 4 5 As one
of the primary mechanisms that banks use to manage their credit exposure to
other banks, the degree of variation in CDS spreads likely reflects, at least in
part, the effort banks devote to monitoring and managing their credit exposures
to other banks.' 4 6
At the same time, there are meaningful limitations on the efficacy of banks
as disciplinarians. Many flow from the incentive issues described below, but oth-
ers arise from institutional and positional constraints. Banks, for example, are
never going to have the inside access afforded regulators, nor are they going to
enjoy the broad set of remedial responses that regulators may employ.' 4 The key
here is that there is reason to expect that banks may be highly effective in moni-
toring and responding to changes in other banks' risk profiles.
B. Incentives
Banks monitor and discipline one another because they have an economic
interest in limiting their downside risk exposures; it is not to maximize social
welfare. The two aims often overlap. If a bank takes excessive risks, other banks
should penalize it accordingly, thereby discouraging such behavior. In those cir-
cumstances, the discipline banks impose on one another fulfills the ideal of mar-
144. Id.; see ao Thomas B. King, Discipline and Liquidity in the Interbank Market, 40 J. MONEY,
CREDIT, &BANKING 295, 295 (2008) ("Using 20 years of panel data, [this article] demonstrate[s]
that high-risk banks have consistently paid more than safe banks for interbank loans and have been
less likely to use these loans as a source of liquidity."); Paolo Angelini et al., The Interbank Market
After August 2007: What Has Changed and Why? (Bank of Italy, Working Paper No. 731, 2009)
(finding that the importance of borrower bank characteristics to interbank lending rates increased
after August 2007). But see Viral Acharya & Ouarda Merrouche, Precautionary Hoarding of
Liquidity and Inter-bank Markets: Evidence From the Sub-prime Crisis (Sept. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (finding that in the United Kingdom, the borrowing rates of the ten
largest banks do not vary significantly with bank characteristics).
145. Hart & Zingales, supra note 40, at 31 tbl.1 (providing CDS spreads for leading banks on four key
dates leading up to and during the crisis, showing significant variation by bank on each of the
dates); see ROBERT J. GROSSMAN & MARTIN HANSEN, FITCHRATINGS, CDS SPREADS AS
DEFAULT RISK INDICATORS 12 (2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/63597725/
CDS-Spreads-as-Default-Risk-Indicators-Feb-2011 (showing CDS spreads for U.S. broker
dealers, including Lehman and Bear Stearns, from January 2006 through October 2010).
146. See sup ra Part IC.
147. See infra P rt IV.B.
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ket discipline embodied in the Basel Accords and embraced by many of its pro-
ponents.' 48 In general, when the issue is the quantum of risk that a bank is tak-
ing, the interests of banks and society largely align-excessive risk taking is bad
for both.
Moving past the question of whether a bank's risk taking is excessive to
consider the nature of the risks a bank is assuming, however, reveals that banks'
incentives may be suboptimal in a number of regards. As the Crisis reflects, one
significant source of divergence relates to liquidity risk. The interbank market
plays an important role helping to smooth access to liquidity during normal times.
At the same time, the interbank market can give rise to inefficiencies and may
exacerbate liquidity contractions when signs of trouble arise. These dynamics
help to explain the existence and value of having a central bank that can function
as a lender of last resort.'4 9 This Article examines other ways that interbank dis-
cipline may lead to socially suboptimal outcomes in the absence of intervention,
focusing attention outside of crisis periods. Three issues-systemic risk, tail
risks, and correlated risks-merit particular attention, although more may well
exist.
1. Systemic Risk
The most significant way that banks' incentives vary from the socially op-
timal is in their relative concern with systemic risk. Because of the large ex-
ternalities associated with banking crises, banks and their stakeholders do not
face optimal incentives to avoid systemic risk." The possibility of government
intervention transforms this divergence into a source of moral hazard.'5 ' This
148. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 57.
149. E.g., Acharya et al., supra note 68 (showing that banks may use market power in ways that
contribute to effective liquidity shortages, providing a rationale for central banks to serve as a lender
of last resort); Allen et al., supra note 68, at 640 ("[T]he introduction of a central bank that engages
in open market operations to fix . . . the short term interest rate[] removes the inefficiency
associated with a lack of hedging opportunities [under certain circumstances]."); Xavier Freixas et
al., Bank Liuidity, Interbank Markets, andMonetary Policy, 24 REV. IN. STUD. 2656, 2658 (2011)
('[A] central bank's interest rate policy can directly improve liquidity conditions in the interbank
lending market during a financial crisis."). For a discussion of how the interbank market function-
ed during the Crisis, see Afonso et al., supra note 143.
150. See supra Part I.A.
151. See supra Part I.A; see abo Pragyan Deb, Market Frictions, Interbank Linkages and Excessive
Interconnections 19 (July 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/
debp/Papers/NetworkPaper.pdf (using a model to show that in the presence of government
guarantees, including implicit expectations of a bailout, "competitive banks find it optimal to
participate in the interbank market even when the risk of contagion is high and it is socialiy
suboptimal to do so").
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means that as the probability that a bank's failure will have systemic repercussions
increases, so too does the magnitude of the disparity between a bank's incentives
and those that would maximize social welfare.
That government bailouts can never be assured does not undermine the
role that a possible bailout plays in other banks' risk assessments. A core func-
tion of risk management is to assign probabilities to various possible outcomes.
Government bailouts, and the situations in which they are provided, are suffi-
ciently predictable that risk managers have long taken them into account when
assessing a bank's creditworthiness. For example, when Moody's assigns a cred-
it rating to a bank, it engages in a two-step process. First, it engages in a thor-
ough analysis of the bank as a standalone entity and assigns it an initial rating on
that basis.152 It then engages in a separate analysis in which it considers the
probability that the bank will receive external support, including a government-
funded bailout, if it faces financial distress.>s Moody's then aqjusts its rating ac-
cordingly. Thus, the final rating given to any bank is the product of both the
bank's actual creditworthiness and Moodys assessment of the probability that it
would receive a bailout.'54 A bank's creditors, including other banks, make com-
parable aqjustments to their analyses.>s Empirical evidence also reveals that
banks are capable of very quickly revising their estimations of the probability of a
bailout when new information comes to light, and that they rapidly adjust their
willingness to work with other banks accordingly."'
The most well-recognized way in which these dynamics become manifest,
and the one for which there is the best empirical support, is the phenomenon of
banks becoming too big to fail. Economists studying new bond issuances, for
example, found that "[tihe larger the bank, the less its portfolio matters for ex-
plaining the spreads on its bonds."' 7 The effect was particularly pronounced for
152. IFIGENIAPALIMERI ETAL., MOODYS GLOBAL BANKING, NO. 114705, SPECIAL COMMENT:
CALIBRATING BANK RATINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRisIs 4
(2009), available athttp://www.iflr.com/pdfs/web-seminars/regulatory-capital/moodys_2-09.pdf.
153. Id. at 4-5.
154. Id.
155. DUFFIE, supra note 29, at 5 (explaining that "creditors of systemically important financial
institutions may offer financing at terms that reflect the likelihood of a government bailout,"
contributing to the moral hazard); Reint Gropp et al., Equity and Bond Market Signah as Leading
Indicators ofBank Fragility (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 150, 2002) (finding that
subordinated debt yields reflect bank risk only when there is not a strong expectation of
government support).
156. Afonso et al., supra note 143, at 1111 (finding that when the "AG bailout was announced, the...
spreads [for interbank loans] for the largest banks fell steeply" while "small banks ... continued to
face higher spreads").
157. Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test, 20 J. FIN.
sERVICES RES. 195 (2001).
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banks that the government had previously indicated may be too big to fail.'s In
other words, the market views some banks as likely being too big to fail, and
those banks are able to borrow at lower interest rates than they would otherwise
have to pay as a result. Recent studies on the relationship between a bank's size
and the spread on credit default swaps referencing the bank provide further evi-
dence that the market views some banks as too big to fail and this affects market
participants' willingness to assume credit risk with respect to a bank.s' A recent
study places the value of the implicit government subsidy provided to the eight-
een largest U.S. bank holding companies as a result of too-big-to-fail bailout ex-
pectations at over $34 billion per year.160
Not surprisingly, there is also evidence that banks, aware of these benefits,
actively seek to become too big to fail in order to enjoy the government subsidy
lavished on such institutions.' 6 ' A feedback loop thus exists. If a bank knows it
can extract better terms from creditors and others by increasing its probability of
receiving a bailout, it will change itself to increase that probability, thereby ena-
bling it to enjoy the current economic advantages that flow from that probabilis-
tic change. Interbank relationships provide an important mechanism through
which banks can enjoy immediate benefits from being viewed as a probable
bailout recipient.
Too big to fail remains a significant issue, but it is no longer the only one.
The Crisis made clear that the systemic significance of a bank's collapse, and
hence the likelihood of a government bailout, is not just a product of the bank's
size. Systemic risk also increases when a bank is "too interconnected to fail" or
"too correlated to fail."162 We can therefore expect that banks will also consider
these characteristics in evaluating their relationships with other banks.
When a bank enters into a contractual arrangement or otherwise engages
with another bank, each bank increases its connectivity to the other. The more
connected a bank is to other banks, the greater the probability that its failure will
have systemic consequences, and the greater the probability that the government
158. Id
159. E.g., Manja Volz & Michael Wedow, Market Disciline and Too-Big-to-Fail in the CDS Market:
Does BanksSize Reduce Market DiscPline?, 18J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 195 (2011).
160. DEAN BAKER &TRAVIS MCARTHUR, CTR. FOR EcON. &POLICY RESEARCH, THE VALUE
OF THE "Too BIG TO FAIL" BIG BANK SUBSIDY 2 (2009).
161. E.g., Maria Fabiana Penas & Haluk Unal, Gains in Bank Mergers: Evidence From the Bond Markets,
74 J. FIN. ECON. 149 (2004); Edward J. Kane, Incentives for Banking Megamergerc What Motives
Might Regulators Infer From Event-Study Evidence?, 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 671
(2000). For a review of the literature on the benefits and drawbacks of large, complex banks and
the extent to which bank growth may be attributed to efforts to become too big to fail, see
Wilmarth, supra note 45, at 302-12, and sources cited therein.
162. Coffee, supra note 61, at 816.
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will intervene to prevent its failure. As a result, when Bank A evaluates whether
to enter into an arrangement with Bank B, Bank A may reasonably expect that
the very process of creating that relationship increases the likelihood that the
government would intervene in the event that either Bank A or Bank B faces fi-
nancial difficulties. The net result is that entering into the agreement benefits
Bank A directly, by increasing the probability it will be bailed out, and indirectly,
by reducing the magnitude of the credit risk it assumes in its dealing with Bank
B (by also increasing the probability of Bank B being bailed out). Thus, the re-
sulting increased interconnectivity may itself increase Bank A's incentive to enter
into a relationship with Bank B.
Similar dynamics arise with respect to correlated risk taking. In the event
that a bank fails for highly idiosyncratic reasons, regulators have little reason
(apart from the two just mentioned) not to allow the bank to fail. Regulators al-
so have tools for limiting the systemic repercussions of such a failure.'6 ' The sit-
uation changes dramatically, however, if numerous banks are exposed to a similar
set of risks. In determining whether to intervene if a common exposure proves
problematic, the government must now consider the systemic significance of al-
lowing all of the exposed banks to fail when determining whether to intervene.
Thus, if Bank A faces a choice between increasing its economic exposure to Bank
B or Bank C and both banks are exposed to an identical amount of risk, Bank A
should favor the bank with the risk profile that most resembles the risk profiles of
other banks. Once again, this effect is likely to lead to increased fragility. Banks
are rewarded for having risk profiles that resemble those of other banks, whereas
the system would be more stable if banks assumed more idiosyncratic risks.' 64
To be clear, there are two related issues that arise from the expectation that
a government may bail out a bank when the systemic costs of its failure are suffi-
ciently great. As an initial matter, banks themselves have an incentive to become
more interconnected and to have risk exposures that are more closely correlated
to other banks in order to increase the likelihood they will receive a bailout. The
second issue is that interbank discipline may exacerbate these tendencies by
providing a mechanism through which banks can realize immediate economic
benefits based on expectations of a bailout. To the extent a bank grows, increas-
es its connectivity, or alters the nature of its risk exposures in a way that increases
the probability of a government bailout, those changes affect other banks' as-
sessments of that bank. As a result, other banks should be relatively more willing
163. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. II, 124
Stat. 1376, 1442-1520 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5395 (Supp. V 2011)).
164. Eg., Charles K. Whitehead, Destrmetive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323 (2011) (de-
scribing the destructive potential that arises from banks assuming similar risks).
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to work with a bank when it changes its profile in any of these ways. To be sure,
this dynamic is not specific to other banks. All of a bank's creditors may be ex-
pected to adjust their expectations regarding the credit risk a bank poses to ac-
count for the possibility of a government bailout.'6' Nonetheless, this problem
may be particularly great in the context of interbank interactions. Precisely
because of the numerosity and diversity of the connections among banks, they
can respond swiftly and effectively when another bank changes its risk profile in a
way that affects the probability it will be bailed out.'66 Moreover, all of the fac-
tors suggesting that banks may be particularly adept at disciplining other banks
also facilitate banks' ability to detect changes in a bank's risk profile that affect
the probability it will receive a bailout.
There are also specific reasons to expect that interbank discipline is more
likely to contribute to correlated risk taking and increased interconnectivity than
other forms of market discipline. To assess how correlated a bank's risk profile is
to that of other banks, it is necessary to consider not just that bank's risk profile,
but also the risk profiles of other banks. Because of the costs associated with ob-
taining and processing such information, few stakeholders will have an adequate
incentive to engage in such an analysis. By contrast, a typical complex bank
has relationships with most other complex banks and thus already possesses the
information necessary to reach such judgments. Relatedly, interbank activity is
the source of connectivity; it is the mechanism through which banks can exploit
this subsidy.
That banks' incentives are not welfare optimizing is far from a new insight.
Nonetheless, the analysis here sheds new light onto the mechanisms through
which the moral hazard arising from the possibility of a government bailout
becomes manifest. Even if very few banks are trying to exploit these dynamics
today, that could change, and it could change quickly. Banks operate in a highly
competitive environment. When one bank realizes that changing its operations
in a particular way allows it to realize immediate gains while exposing it to only a
limited portion of the associated downside risk, other banks are likely to fol-
165. The dual nature of the problem inherent in bailout expectations is not unique to banking. See, e.g.,
Charles W. Calomiris, The IMFs Imprudent Role as Lender ofLast Resort, 17 CATO J. 275, 277
(1998); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach,
85 CORNELL L. REv. 956, 961-62 (2000).
166. See CAPITAL-MARKETS ACTIVITIES MANUAL, supra note 107, § 2020.1, at 10 (stating that
banks that are active dealers "should have counterparty credit exposure monitored daily").
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low.' History is replete with examples of banks doing just that, even as their
actions increase in the fragility of the financial system as a whole.' 8
2. Tail Risks
Banks' incentives to alter their risk taking behavior and assessments of
other banks to exploit implicit government subsidies are not the only way that
interbank discipline may lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. A second, and
somewhat overlapping, way that banks' risk management systems have proved
wanting is with respect to their capacity to capture and appropriately measure tail
risks. Tail risks are low probability events which, if they arise, result in signifi-
cant losses (or gains).' 9 A common theme in many accounts of the Crisis is
that banks did not adequately seek to understand and limit their exposure to tail
risks.' 70 A partial explanation for this failure is that one of the primary mecha-
nisms banks used to manage risk exposures-Value at Risk (VaR) models-have
the known flaw of underestimating tail risks."' Incentive issues similar to those
associated with systemic risk exacerbate the challenge. Banks can earn significant
profits from excessively discounting tail risks, and such risks often become mani-
fest only in extreme adverse circumstances, that is, in the type of conditions when
the financial system as a whole is most likely to be under stress and the gov-
167. POSNER, supra note 1, at 264 ("[C]ompetition ... force[s] banks to take risks... , provided the
risks are legal and profit-maximizing, whatever their consequences for the economy as a whole.").
168. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED
EXCESS ON WALL STREET 5 (2009) (explaining that "Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill
Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns" were long on a constant verge of "a funding crisis"
because of their excessive reliance on short-term credit); Demirgi4-Kunt & Huizinga, supra note
49, at 647 (showing that "higher fee income or nondeposit funding share. . . increase bank risk").
169. Peter Conti-Brown, AProposedFat-Tail Risk Metric: Disclosures, Dervatives andthe Measurement of
FinancialRisk, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1462-63 (2010).
170. E.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Manufacturing Tail Risk:cA Perspective on the Financial Crisis of2007-
2009, 4 FOUNDATIONS &TRENDS FIN. 249, 250-51 (2009).
171. E.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 169, at 1465 (identifying as a primary flaw of VaR that "in times of
crisis, VaR fails to provide any clear content on risk exposures in the long tail, especially when those
tails are fat"); Yasuhiro Yamai & Toshinao Yoshiba, ComparativeAnalyses ofExpected Shortfall and
Value-at-Risk (3): Their Validity Under Market Stress, 20 MONETARY & ECON. STUD. 181, 182
(2002) (explaining that VaR models tend to "disregard the fat-tailed properties of actual returns,
and underestimate the likelihood of extreme price movements"); Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement:
Were the Measures Used to Evaluate Wall Street Trades Flawed?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at
24, 26-27 (quoting David Einhorn, founder of prominent hedge fund Greenlight Capital, who
analogizes VaR to "an air bag that works all the time, except when you have a car accident" because
of its failure to capture tail risks).
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ernment is most likely to intervene.172 Assuming that the tools and metrics a
bank uses for assessing its own risk exposures are similar to those it uses
when assessing the risk exposures of other banks, a typical bank's lack of re-
gard for the tail risks to which it is exposed directly portends a similar lack of
regard for tail risks to which banks with whom it deals may be exposed. Once
again, these dynamics shape incentives in problematic ways, as banks are
underpenalized for assuming tail risks.
There is new regulatory pressure on banks to perform stress tests and
otherwise evaluate how they would fare in extremely adverse circumstances.1 73
Nonetheless, tail risks are difficult to identify and measure and banks continue
to lack adequate incentives to identify and respond to them. Assuming that
banks do not filly penalize other banks for assuming tail risks-either because
the risk management tools they use do not capture them or because they have an
incentive to discount them-the discipline banks impose on one another may
accentuate their tendency to assume excessive tail risks.
3. Correlation Seeking
Similar issues arise with respect to correlated risk taking, which may pose
challenges even apart from systemic risk. Richard Squire has shown that because
equity holders have limited liability, firms will rationally discount contingent lia-
bilities to the extent that such risks are likely to become manifest in situations
where the firm would already be bankrupt. 417 As a result, firms should seek to as-
sume contingent liabilities that are positively correlated to significant risks to
which they are already exposed. Squire labels such behavior "correlation seek-
ing."17s In order to engage in correlation seeking, a firm must be able to make
sophisticated judgments about the risks to which it is exposed, the probability
those risks will bankrupt the firm, and the correlation between those risks
and other risks that the firm might assume. In light of the centrality of risk
172. E.g., Acharya et al., supra note 170, at 291 (arguing that "the root cause of the crisis was the desire
of highly leveraged [complex banks] to take even greater risks, generating even higher short-term
'profits," which they accomplished by "manufacturing" tail risks).
173. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(i)(2),
124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (Supp. V 2011)).
174. See Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World ofRisky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151,
1158-59 (2010) (detailing the advantages to shareholders posed by correlating company risks);
Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 607-08 (2011)
(explaining shareholders' interest in assuming intragroup credit guarantees as a means of increasing
value for shareholders at the expense of creditors who will be unable to recover in the event the
corporate group as a whole goes bankrupt).
175. See sources cited supra note 174.
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management to banking and the significant resources banks invest in the en-
deavor, banks may be particularly adept at the practice. Potentially counterbal-
ancing correlation seeking by banks is the fact that banks and other financial
firms are aware of this risk and are likely to be more adept than most counterpar-
ties at identifying such behavior and responding accordingly."' Moreover,
changes to the schemes used to compensate bank executives may make it so they
are not solely responsive to equity holders, reducing their incentive to engage in
correlation seeking.177
Assuming that banks engage in correlation seeking, when Bank A evaluates
whether to assume credit risk with respect to Bank B, Bank A will reduce its as-
sessment of the associated cost to the extent that Bank A believes it will already
be bankrupt should the risk (of Bank B failing) become manifest. To make the
example more concrete, if Bank A has significant exposure to commercial real es-
tate arising from loans, guarantees, and other commitments, Bank A should be
relatively more willing to serve as a protection seller for credit default swaps on
a bank similarly exposed. This means that if Bank A is considering taking on a
contingent liability with respect to Bank B or Bank C and the magnitude of their
risk exposures are identical, Bank A should favor the bank whose risk exposures
are more closely correlated to its own. While the relevant reference point-the
risk profile of the disciplining bank-is different from the relevant reference
point for the systemic risk issue-the risk profile typical of banks-the effect of
correlation seeking may be to exaggerate the tendencies described above. Banks
are rewarded, and thereby incentivized, to assume risks that are similar to the
risks to which other banks are exposed; they are also discouraged from assuming
idiosyncratic risks.
These insights into banks' incentives, coupled with the preceding Parts,
provide a picture of a system that is powerful, imperfect, and, from a social wel-
fare perspective, flawed. This implies that we can build a more stable financial
system by reconsidering regulatory priorities and the allocation of finite regula-
tory resources in a way that addresses interbank discipline. The next Part pro-
vides the final piece of background necessary in order to determine the best way
forward.
176. INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 10 (warning banks to be attuned to this type of risk).
177. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 956 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5641).
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IV. BANK SUPERVISION
This Part introduces the key bank regulators. It examines the aims of bank
regulators, in part by looking at their history, the tools they have been given to
accomplish those aims, and how they have used those tools. The focus is on bank
examination as the mode of regulation most likely to duplicate, and potentially
able to complement and counteract, interbank discipline. An additional reason
for this focus is that bank examination remains a critical component of financial
regulation yet has received relatively little attention in financial reform discus-
sions. This introduction is brief, reflecting the Article's primary aim of drawing
attention to interbank discipline. Yet even this sparse introduction provides an
important point of reference for assessing the policy implications of interbank
discipline.
A. History and Incentives
Currently, bank supervision is carried out at the federal level by three feder-
al regulators, the Federal Reserve, the OCC, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), with primary oversight responsibility allocated according
to the nature of the bank.' As a result of mergers, conversions, and a bankrupt-
cy, the leading investment banks are all now regulated as banks."' Additionally,
the Federal Reserve's oversight authority was expanded post-Crisis to encompass
large financial institutions that are systemically significant even if they are not
formally banks, so all U.S. complex banks, as that term is used here, are subject
to oversight by one or more of these regulators. 8 o
The supervisory authority given to the banking regulators, and the aims of
such oversight, stem largely from the Banking Act of 1933. That act created the
FDIC, instituted deposit insurance, and expanded the oversight authority of
178. The Federal Reserve has primary oversight responsibility for all bank holding companies and state
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve; the OCC has primary responsibility for all
national banks and thrifts; the FDIC has primary responsibility for state banks and thrifts that are
not members of the Federal Reserve. See generally MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40249, WHO REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S.
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (2009) (providing a summary of the primary federal institutions and
mechanisms present in the U.S. financial regulation system).
179. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, FinancialDebateRenews Scrutiny on Banks' Size, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010,
at Al (describing how "Bank of America swallowed Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan Chase bought Bear
Stearns," and "Goldman and Morgan converted to bank holding companies").
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 113 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§5323).
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both the Federal Reserve and the OCC.'8 As a result, bank examination prac-
tices and procedures were formulated initially with the primary aim of protecting
the insurance fund managed by the FDIC and, hence, tended to focus on main-
taining the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions whose bank-
ruptcy might result in claims against the fund. Maintaining the stability of the
overall financial system was also a clear aim of bank oversight, but until the Crisis,
it was largely assumed that the stability of the system would follow from efforts
to maintain the safety and soundness of the individual institutions that constitute
the system.182
The focus on ensuring the safety and soundness of individual banks holding
insured deposits has been reiterated and affirmed over time. Even the Federal
Reserve, which has long had greater responsibility with respect to macroeconom-
ic considerations than other bank regulators, has made this a top priority of its
bank oversight activities, and it has done so even in its oversight of bank holding
companies, institutions that control but are not themselves depositary institu-
tions."' Other institutional arrangements further perpetuate the focus on the
safety and soundness of individual financial institutions. For example, each bank
regulator has an independent inspector general that must undertake a detailed
loss review every time a bank failure results in a material loss to the FDIC's in-
surance fund or exhibits unusual circumstances that warrant an in-depth review.18
Knowing that their actions will be closely scrutinized in connection with such a
failure augments the tendency of examiners to make the safety and soundness
of individual banks their top priority. To be sure, there have been significant
changes in how bank regulators seek to promote the safety and soundness of in-
181. See, e.g., Mark B. Greenlee, Historical Review of "Umbrella Supervision" by the Board of Governors of
the FederalReserve System, 27 REV. BANKING &FIN. L. 407, 453 (2008) (describing how the Fed's
authority over bank holding companies grew incrementally, starting in 1933); Edward L. Symons,
Jr., The UnitedStates Banking System, 19 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 1, 11 (1993).
182. MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., INT'L CTR. FOR MONETARY & BANKING STUDIES &
CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, at xi (2 0 09 ) ("The current
approach to systemic regulation implicitly assumes that we can make the system as a whole safe by
simply trying to make sure that individual banks are safe.").
183. Fed. Reserve Bd., Letter From Fed. Reserve Bd. to Fed. Bank Examiners, SR 00-13 (Aug. 15,
2000) (explaining that the purpose of consolidated supervision is to ensure that bank holding
companies "are operated in a safe and sound manner so that their financial condition does not
threaten the viability of affiliated depository institutions" (emphasis added)), quoted in Greenlee,
supsra note 181, at 443.
184. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k) (2006). 0CC is a division of the U.S. Treasury Department and thus
subject to review by its inspector general.
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dividual financial institutions over this period, but the focal point has remained
relatively constant.'
Another constant is the expectation that bank examiners can best promote
safety and soundness by using their oversight authority to engage in a thorough
examination of each bank and, on the basis of that examination, reaching firm
conclusions about the bank's overall health. Even today, the Federal Reserve, for
example, expects its examiners at the completion of each examination, "[t]o reach
conclusions regarding the present condition of the bank[, t]o reach conclusions
regarding the future prospects of the bank[, and tlo determine the bank's ability
to meet demands in the ordinary course of business or reasonably unusual cir-
cumstances.""' 6 This is comparable to the expectations placed on examiners in
1933, when the nature of banking, buttressed by the Glass-Steagall Act, made
banks much simpler, bank examination far easier, and "permitted the regulators
to channel their efforts and expertise more efficiently."'
This brief history sheds light on the incentives of bank examiners. While
one might presume that regulators should aim to maximize social welfare, in
practice, incentives are often shaped by the history behind a regulator's creation
and the tasks with which it is charged.'"' The history of bank oversight sug-
gests that the key regulators, while concerned with maintaining the stability of
the overall financial system, focus primarily on the survival of the individual insti-
tutions constituting that system. This history also suggests that institutional ar-
rangements within bank regulators are similarly structured to further this aim.
Further insight comes from looking at the authority given to bank examiners and
their use of that authority.
B. Institutional Competence
Bank examiners enjoy a number of advantages over market participants, in-
cluding banks. Many of these advantages relate to access. In order to assess the
185. Garten, supra note 47, at 504-05 (discussing the historical focus on narrow banking, the shift to a
debtor-based approach and a subsequent shift to a deregulatory, equity-based approach to bank
regulation).
186. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., Div. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION, COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL § 5020.2 (2012) [hereinafter
COMMERCIAL BANK MANUAL].
187. Garten, supra note 47, at 520. The Glass-Steagall Act, as originally conceived and implemented,
created a hard line separating commercial banking from investment banking, resulting in less
complex institutions.
188. For an innovative assessment of the incentives facing individual bank examiners and how they
might be improved, see M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Perfrmance, 85
S. CAL. L. REv. 1003 (2012).
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safety and soundness of the institutions they oversee, each regulator is given
broad oversight authority. OCC examiners, for example, "have power to make a
thorough examination of all the affairs of [any national] bank," including the
"power to administer oaths and to examine any of the officers and agents thereof
under oath."189 Further accentuating regulators' unique access is their shift from
periodic examinations to a regime of ongoing monitoring for the largest complex
banks.'o This means that regulators have fulltime teams of examiners working
at each of the leading complex banks, closely following their operations and
regularly interacting with their personnel.
This type of access enables regulators to witness and analyze aspects of a
bank's risk profile and activities that are not transparent to, and may even be
hidden from, market participants like banks. Bank examiners, for example, are
often in a better position than market participants to verify the accuracy of infor-
mation that a bank discloses, including the accuracy of its disclosures regarding its
policies, procedures, and even risk exposures. Bank examiners may also be in a
relatively better position to identify operational risks to which a bank may be
exposed, such as those arising from weaknesses in a bank's internal controls.
Empirical evidence supports the notion that this may be a way for examiners to
add value, as studies have found that examiners may "exert additional disci-
pline, beyond that provided by a bank's private auditors," "examiners have a
richer information set than the market does," at least some of the time,191 and
"examiners [a]re particularly good at discovering information that managers
would prefer to conceal."192
Yet another advantage possessed by bank regulators arises from the tools
they have to respond when they identify trouble. Decisions that banks make
with respect to their dealings with other banks are generally bundled decisions.
A disciplining bank may, for example, engage in a thorough analysis suggesting
that another bank has strong management, a healthy balance sheet, including
high-quality assets and low expected funding costs, and good growth prospects,
but the disciplining bank's analysis may further suggest that the bank is exposed
189. 12 U.S.C. § 481 (2006).
190. Review ofRegulators' Oversight of Risk Management Systems at a Limited Number ofLarge, Complex
FinancialInstitutions: Hearing Bfore the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. &Invs., Comm. on Banking, Hous.
& Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Orice M. Williams, Director of Financial
Markets and Community Investment) [hereinafter Statement Regarding Oversight of Risk
Management Systems].
191. See supra note 44.
192. Mark J. Flannery, Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U S.
Empirical Evidence, 30 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 273, 294-95 (1998) (surveying the
relevant literature).
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to potentially significant downside risks from its overseas operations. In deter-
mining how to proceed in light of such an assessment, the disciplining bank
must find a way to translate this multidimensional analysis into one-dimensional
metrics, like credit exposure limits. Such decisions have important economic
implications and thus can have powerful disciplining effects, but they are neces-
sarily quite coarse.
Examiners, by contrast, are not so constrained. Examiners have an array of
tools, both formal and informal, that they can wield to bring about narrow but
important changes in a bank's operations.193 Bank regulators have the authori-
ty to issue cease-and-desist orders to compel banks to undertake particular
conduct, to issue cease-and-desist orders against individual officers, directors
and other insiders to further influence a bank's operations, to impose civil penal-
ties, and even to remove bank management under certain circumstances. 194
Regulators also have an array of less formal mechanisms for influencing bank be-
havior. For example, the need for regulatory approval for many activities, rang-
ing from branch openings to acquisitions, combined with "the threat of severe
sanctions, although rarely used, [has] made bank management more willing to
acquiesce in the regulators' informal requests for compliance." 9 s
Despite their exceptional access and tool kit, finite resources, imperfections
in the incentives and skill sets of those conducting bank examinations, and other
factors limit the efficacy of the bank examination process. In order to develop a
more complete picture of the institutional competence of bank examiners, it is
important to look past the authority granted to them to consider how they actu-
ally use that authority. Agency costs within regulators complicate this analysis
significantly, just as they do with banks, but some insights are possible. Experi-
ence suggests that despite their massive toolkit, bank examiners regularly un-
derutilize the tools available to them. A recent study by the Government
Accountability Office, for example, found that regulators identified an array of
weaknesses, including "inadequate oversight of institutions' risks by senior man-
agement," "weaknesses in models used to measure and manage risk," and "nu-
merous stress testing weaknesses" at the leading complex banks in the years
before the Crisis, but the regulators quite often failed to impose disciplinary
measures commensurate with the weaknesses they identified.196 A further chal-
193. E.g., Garten, supra note 47, at 537-38; Symons, supra note 181, at 18-19.
194. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b), (b)(1), (e)(1), (j) (2006); Symons, supra note 181, at 19-20 (explaining that
the civil penalties are most commonly used against individuals in order to get "to the root of the
problem").
195. Garten, supra note 47, at 538.
196. Statement Regarding Oversight ofRisk Management Systems, supra note 190.
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lenge is that forcing the closure of a bank-the most extreme but also the most
important of a bank regulator's tools-can be viewed as a sign of regulatory fail-
ure and can give rise to short-term costs. Thus, it is not surprising that there is a
long history of bank regulators failing to close banks in a timely fashion.197
Experience also sheds light on other institutional considerations, such as
the processes through which bank examination procedures change in response to
changes in banking. The Federal Reserve, the OCC, and the FDIC all use the
same basic methodology as a starting point for their examinations procedures.
Originally adopted in 1979, the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System
regime, more commonly known as CAMELS, provides a composite scored
based on a bank's capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidi-
ty, and sensitivity to market risk.198 All three agencies have made some signifi-
cant changes to their examination procedures in light of the changing nature of
banking, and have made further changes to address weaknesses revealed by the
Crisis and third party reports. The Federal Reserve, for example, recognizes that
"[elvolving financial instruments and markets have enabled banking organiza-
tions to rapidly reposition their portfolio risk exposures," and it has adopted a
"risk-focused" approach to examinations in response."' The FDIC and OCC
have also updated their examination procedures and all three recognize the
fundamental differences between community-based banks and today's complex
banks.200 Nonetheless, many of the core elements of the bank examination pro-
cess have not changed. The bank examination process remains largely focused
on the safety and soundness of individual banks, CAMELS remains a cen-
terpiece of the examination process for all three regulators, and a firm's
CAMELS rating remains a core component in determining how much a bank
must pay for its deposit insurance.20' The CAMELS components have also re-
197. See, e.g., EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? (1989);
Catherine England, Lessons From the Saving and Loan Debacle: The Case for Further Financial
Deregulation, 15 CATO REv. BUS. &GOv'T 36, 40 (1992).
198. E.g., Foreword to COMMERCIAL BANK MANUAL, supra note 186, at 1-2.
199. COMMERCIAL BANK MANUAL, supra note 186, § 1000.1, at 4.1.
200. E.g., COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER'S
HANDBOOK 11-15 (2 0 07 ) (describing the CAMELS regulatory ratings and examination
systems); FDIC OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 136, at 7-9 (describing the
Federal Reserve's new "forward-looking supervision" approach); COMMERCIAL BANKMANUAL,
supra note 186, § 1000.1, at 2 (describing examination procedures).
201. E.g., Foreword to COMMERCIAL BANK MANUAL, supra note 186, at 1-2 (explaining that "to
assess the bank's performance and summarize its overall condition, examiners use the [CAMELS]
rating system," and that while there has been greater focus placed on risk management, the
importance of assessing the CAMELS components has not diminished); Risk Categories & Risk-
Based Assessment Rates: Key Provisions Pertaining to Risk-Based Assessments, FDJC,
http://wxvw.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/assessments/iisk.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (providing
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mained remarkably consistent since 1979, undergoing only one significant revi-
sion in 1996, which resulted in the addition of just one component and other
minor modifications.202 No dimension of this persistence can be attributed to
success, as regulators regularly fail to identify troubled banks in a timely manner
and other measures have proven to be better leading indicators that a bank will
face financial distress than the bank's CAMELS rating. 0 3 Combined with the
history provided in the preceding Part, this suggests that bank regulators, and
bank examination procedures, tend toward incremental change, even when
the banks they are regulating are undergoing dramatic transformations.
Another reason that bank regulators often fail to respond effectively to the
dynamism of banks and banking is because they lack the tools, authority, or will
for reasons relating to the political nature of the processes through which regula-
tors are formed, granted authority, and held accountable. These processes have
been critiqued on a number of grounds, ranging from a strong tendency for inef-
ficient systems to persist to being overly reactive when things go wrong.204 Put
differently, in contrast to the strong economic incentives driving banks and other
market participants, regulators are embedded in a system in which the incentives
might not just be weaker, but also might pull in different and contrary directions.
This overview of bank regulators is limited and painted in broad strokes,
eliding variety that exists within and among the regulators and providing only a
cursory introduction to some of the institutional dynamics that characterize bank
regulators and their examination departments in particular. Nonetheless, it illus-
trates clearly that bank examiners have different skill sets, tools, and incentives
than banks. These differences increase the potential for real value to be created
by allocating finite resources in a way that capitalizes on the relative strengths of
bank examiners.
methodology for calculating how much a bank must pay for its FDIC insurance and revealing the
centrality of a bank's CAMELS rating to that determination).
202. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 62 Fed.
Reg. 752 (Jan. 6, 1997) (describing the modest changes adopted).
203. E.g., Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,672, 10,683 chart 3 (Feb. 25, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327) (showing that proposed measures do a better job of predicting bank
performance than CAMELS).
204. E.g., Jody Freeman &Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HAR. L.
REV. 1131, 1139 (2012) (drawing attention to the frequency with which Congress makes
overlapping or redundant delegations to committees and suggesting that "such delegations are best
explained as by-products of the congressional committee system, which incentivizes members to
expand the jurisdiction of the agencies they oversee in order to direct benefits to their con-
stituencies"); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.. 1521, 1543 (2005) (asserting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was adopted
even though the "decisive balance of research indicates that those mandates [contained in the Act]
will not benefit investors").
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V. IMPLICATIONS
The primary aim of this Article is to draw attention to the power of in-
terbank discipline and shed light on its effects. As both a byproduct of modem
banking and a force that shapes the activities of modem banks, the significance
of this phenomenon cannot be addressed in isolation. The Article's descriptive
account contributes to a number of ongoing debates regarding banks and finan-
cial regulation. For example, responses to the Crisis resulted in larger and more
interconnected banks, even as many commentators have argued that banks
should be significantly smaller and less connected. This Article's insights
contribute to that debate. In showing how interbank discipline may reduce ex-
cessive risk taking, the Article suggests that there may be benefits to interbank
connections that are underappreciated in most accounts. At the same time, in
drawing attention to the way that interbank discipline serves as an important
mechanism through which banks may exploit the implicit government subsidy
inherent in the possibility of a bailout, the Article simultaneously suggests that
interbank connections may be troubling for a reason that is similarly underappre-
ciated in most accounts. There is reason to suspect that the more troubling as-
pects of interbank discipline exceed the corresponding benefits when banks have
characteristics that make them likely bailout recipients.
At the same time, the ramifications of interbank discipline on such debates
cannot be resolved in the confines of this Article. While the effects of interbank
discipline are significant, they are also modest in relation to the other benefits
and drawbacks of the evolution in banking. To try to answer such questions on
the basis of interbank discipline would have the quality of the tail wagging the
dog. The Article, accordingly, does not try to address, much less resolve, the fill
panoply of policy issues raised by the dynamics here revealed. Instead, it consid-
ers only a subset of policy implications, focusing on those that have received rela-
tively little attention in post-Crisis reforms.
In addition to being necessarily incomplete, the Article's recommendations
are necessarily preliminary. Whether and to what extent each should be pursued
are determinations that can be made only with further study. There are a num-
ber of reasons for this. As an initial matter, the degree of interbank discipline is a
byproduct of interbank activity and that is not fixed. A number of policies
adopted in response to the Crisis have the intention or effect of reducing bank
connectivity. The proposed Federal Reserve and OCC regulations to reduce in-
terbank exposures are but one example of the regulatory reform efforts already
1315Interbank Discipline
underway that have the intention or effect of reducing bank connectedness.205
Efforts to push much of the derivatives market into centralized exchanges are
another reform effort that might result in a material reduction in interbank expo-
sures.t0 Similarly, other policy responses to the Crisis, like the capital surcharges
based on bank size and connectedness embodied in Basel III, seek specifically to
counteract banks' tendency to develop the characteristics that might increase the
probability of being bailed out.207 If such efforts succeed in perfectly offsetting
the benefits associated with being a probable bailout recipient, the capacity of in-
terbank discipline to serve as a mechanism through which banks can reap imme-
diate financial benefits from changing their risk profile in socially problematic
ways may become moot. More generally, banking is an inherently dynamic en-
terprise.208  Not only will banks change in response to regulatory reforms but
they will also adjust their degree of discipline in light of other market forces.
Depending on the internal structures banks create to monitor and discipline oth-
er banks, for example, there is a real risk that the degree of interbank discipline
will be cyclical, with discipline becoming less robust during credit bubbles. Es-
tablishing and entrenching a regulatory regime that assumes the current levels of
interbank discipline may thus be almost as problematic as ignoring this phenom-
enon altogether. Despite these many challenges, this Article draws attention to a
phenomenon that affects bank risk taking, appears likely to persist, and gives rise
to a range of policy implications so long as it does. The remainder of this Part
addresses some of those implications.
The Part proceeds in three Subparts. The first Subpart draws attention to a
fact that may seem clear from the analysis here but which has been overlooked at
times by bank regulators. The second Subpart creates a framework for responses
205. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77
Fed. Reg. 594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012); INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 3-4.
206. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act creates clearing and exchange trading requirements for both
swaps and securities-based swaps. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675-82 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § lb-2
(Supp. V 2011)); id. § 763 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
207. See, e.g., Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. at 600; BASEL III, supra note 37, at 7; INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE,
supra note 7, at 3-4.
208. Developments in this vein include new rules requiring banks to execute certain swap transactions
through centralized clearing parties, see § 723 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § lb-2), proposed rules to limit
interbank exposures, see Lending Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,265, 37,268 (proposed June 21, 2012) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 32, 159, 160), enhanced prudential standards to be applied to certain
large bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies, § 115 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5325), and new rules for establishing capital adequacy requirements. See FSOC, 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 39, at 100-01 (describing the new capital requirements imposed by Dodd-
Frank and Basel III and ongoing regulatory attempts to reconcile the two).
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that builds on the complementarity approach advocated here. It addresses
ways that bank regulation, and examination procedures in particular, should
change in order to more effectively promote financial stability in light of in-
terbank discipline. The third Subpart considers additional ways that regulators
may promote effective interbank discipline and use the valuable information this
market produces. The recommendations that follow build on one another, though
most can be pursued independently of one another.
A. Risk Management as a Double-Edged Sword
One policy issue this Article raises relates to banks' risk management sys-
tems. Bank regulators have long encouraged banks to adopt more robust risk
management systems, and regulatory efforts in this vein have ramped up signifi-
cantly in the wake of the Crisis. 209 These efforts are often premised on an as-
sumption that improving risk management is an unmitigated good. This Article
reveals a more complex picture. Banks bear primary responsibility for their own
wellbeing and risk management systems are critical to that endeavor. At the
same time, banks may use risk management systems to alter their activities in
ways that inure to their benefit while simultaneously contributing to the fragility
of the overall financial system. Efforts to exploit the implicit subsidy arising from
the possibility of a bailout out are the most prominent, but not sole, example.
One implication is that bank regulators should pay close attention to how
risk management systems actually work and how they are used in practice, in-
stead of assuming them to be entirely benign. A second implication is that regu-
latory actions that promote the socially productive dimension of interbank
discipline are likely to have the unintended consequence of facilitating its more
problematic effects. Requiring banks to disclose more information about their
risk exposures, for example, might facilitate the capacity of banks and other mar-
ket participants to discipline excessive risk taking, but could also be used to pe-
nalize idiosyncratic risk taking and reward the assumption of more systemically
troubling forms of risk. Given the limitations inherent in regulatory competence
and resources, and the inevitability of interbank activity, this Article generally fa-
vors efforts to promote interbank discipline. Nonetheless, this is but one exam-
ple of the unintended consequences that might result, and hence the need for
further analysis before pursuing any of the recommendations proposed.
209. See, e.g., Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. at 600.
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B. Priorities and Resource Allocation
This Subpart develops the Article's primary policy claim that we should
reevaluate regulatory priorities and policies in light of interbank discipline. It sug-
gests three types of responses-duplication, gap filling, and counteraction-which
collectively should enable interbank discipline and bank examination to work
more effectively as complements and otherwise promote systemic stability. It
further suggests that it may be time to undertake a more fundamental reevalua-
tion of bank oversight priorities and procedures.
1. Reducing Duplication
One important implication of the vast resources banks devote to monitor-
ing and disciplining risk taking at other banks is that it may not make sense for
regulators to devote as many resources as they currently are to duplicating these
activities. This does not mean that bank examiners should cease to engage in
meaningful assessments of the nature and magnitude of the risks to which banks
they examine are exposed. Assessing a bank's overall safety and soundness may
enable examiners to be more effective at those tasks they are well positioned to
undertake. For example, an examiner cannot effectively probe the efficacy of a
bank's risk management system without understanding the risks to which a bank
is exposed and their potential gravity. Moreover, as reflected in the belt-and-
suspenders approach to market discipline, the importance of determining how
risky a bank's activities are and the challenges inherent in making such assess-
ments merit some duplication. Nonetheless, the analysis here suggests that ex-
aminers devote more resources than are justified engaging in risk analyses that
are already being carried out, with perhaps more skill and insight, by other banks.
2. Gap Filling
Devoting proportionately fewer resources to duplicating efforts undertaken
by other banks should enable regulators to devote proportionately more resources
to activities that banks are not motivated or positioned to undertake effectively.
The losses and reporting errors exposed by J.P. Morgan's "London Whale" illus-
trate.210 The nearly $6 billion in losses the bank has incurred are the result
of "trading mistakes," and the gravity of the debacle was made worse as a result of
personnel inside the bank apparently intentionally "placing inaccurate prices on
210. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
1318 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262 (2013)
their positions," in order to hide the losses.21 Verifying that trading practices
conform to a bank's own policies and procedures for valuing assets are the types
of activities that regulators are better suited to perform than other banks.212
While there can be no guarantee that this particular situation would have been
detected earlier, the situation exemplifies why there may be real value in allocat-
ing greater regulatory resources to such endeavors.
The reasons to reconsider how we allocate finite bank resources thus arise
less from concerns about potential waste than from a focus on relative value crea-
tion. While some duplication is likely warranted, the degree will depend in part
on the value of such duplication relative to the potential value that may be created
by devoting greater regulatory resources to other activities. The greater the range
or importance of oversight activities that regulators are uniquely well positioned
to address, the more difficult it is to justify significant duplication.
3. Counteraction
Yet another implication of the power of interbank discipline is that bank
regulators, including bank examiners, should seek to address its adverse effects.
Core elements of our financial regulatory scheme, like the Federal Reserve's
discount window, are designed in part to respond to the tendency for the in-
terbank market to contract more than is optimal during times of crisis. In addi-
tion, other efforts to reign in government bailouts and impose additional burdens
on the banks most likely to receive them may reduce the magnitude of the im-
plicit subsidy available. Nonetheless, given that those responses seem destined
to be incomplete suggests that bank examiners may have an important role to
play in helping address the issues revealed here. In light of examiners' ongoing
monitoring and intimate knowledge of the activities of banks they oversee, bank
examiners may be well positioned to identify changes in a bank's activities that
exploit this subsidy. Moreover, the range of tools available to regulators to en-
courage or compel banks to change particular aspects of their operations may
enable them to respond effectively to such developments. This suggests that,
while the nature of bank examination is always going to be microprudential (that
is, focused on individual institutions) in part, bank examiners may also have a
role to play in macroprudential regulation, that is, regulation aimed to promote
the stability of the overall financial system.
211. Fitzpatrick &Zuckerman, supra note 111.
212. See supra Part IV.B and sources cited therein.
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4. Reconsider Goals
Each of the three preceding considerations suggest that it may be time to
engage in a more thorough evaluation of the appropriate priorities and proce-
dures for bank examinations. Such an inquiry may be particularly timely in light
of the limitations inherent in traditional approaches to financial regulation re-
vealed by the Crisis, including the need for bank regulation to become more
macroprudential in its focus. 213 This is one of the primary lessons from the
Crisis. Nonetheless, it has thus far failed to trigger a broad-based debate about
bank examination comparable to the debates that that it has started with respect
to other aspects of financial regulation.2 14 This Article suggests that it might be
time to start that conversation.
The sketches of the institutional competence of banks relative to examiners
provided here serve as a starting point, but further inquiry is warranted. In addi-
tion to developing a more complete descriptive account of the skills, resources,
norms, and other characteristics of bank examiners and the bank examination
process, attention should also be paid to theoretical considerations. For example,
there may well be ways that bank oversight should assume a more mac-
roprudential dimension beyond counteracting the problematic aspects of inter-
bank discipline. These two lines of inquiry are necessarily related. Placing
theoretically ideal but pragmatically impossible goals on bank examiners is a reci-
pe for failure. At the same time, the institutional competence of bank examiners
should not be treated as fixed. While current personnel, resource constraints,
and other factors may impose meaningful constraints, change is possible. One
aim of the theoretical inquiry, accordingly, should be to inform the type of
change that is desirable.
As an ambitious initial step it may be time to reconsider whether assessing
the safety and soundness of individual institutions should remain the top priority
of bank examiners. It may also be appropriate to reconsider the nature of the
conclusions examiners are asked to reach. In order to render judgments about
the safety and soundness of an individual bank, one must first draw conclusions
about the magnitude and nature of particular risks and then assess the sufficiency
of efforts to manage them. The strength of the U.S. real estate market in 2006
213. See, e.g., BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 182, at xvi-xvii; BEVERLY HIRTLE ET AL., FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 409, MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: LESSONS FROM THE SCAP (2009); Jeffrey Gordon & Colin
Mayer, The Micro, Macro andInternationalDesign ofFinancialRegulation (Columbia Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 422, 2012), avai/ab/e at http://ssr.com/abstract=2047436.
214. A "natural language" search on Westlaw in October 2012 for the terms "bank" and "examination"
did not produce a single article published since the Crisis in the top thirty most relevant results.
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and the prospects for the Euro in 2012 are just two of the types of issues that
have massive ramifications for the safety and soundness of individual banks.
There is little reason to think that the judgment of a single regulator with respect
to such an issue is likely to be more accurate than other banks' collective wisdom
about the same.
At the same time, asking regulators to make such judgments, as the current
regime inevitably requires, has a number of potentially adverse consequences.
First, given the inherently finite nature of regulatory resources, it reduces the re-
sources available for other aspects of bank regulation. Second, the current regime
potentially impedes interbank and other forms of market discipline. Even though
bank examiners' reports and conclusions are not made public, it is well known
that regulators are expected to ensure the safety and soundness of institutions
they oversee. This may reduce market participants' incentives to be as thorough
as they otherwise would in evaluating other institutions. It hence may be appro-
priate to modify the type of conclusions examiners are asked to reach by, for
example, making them narrower or reformulating them as conclusions that
nothing came to the examiners' attention that would justify intervention. Such
changes may have the additional benefit of protecting regulators' reputation, to
the extent such protection is warranted, and discouraging forbearance premised
on the same, thus promoting accountability and credibility.215
C. Working Together
1. Promote Efficacy
In light of the potential for banks to play a socially valuable role in monitor-
ing and disciplining excessive risk taking by other banks, this Article suggests that
regulators should promote the efficacy of such efforts.216 Making it clear that reg-
ulators are not vouching for the safety and soundness of the banks they examine
and altering the nature of the conclusions bank examiners reach should further
this aim, but there are other ways that regulators may futher enhance the quality
of interbank discipline. For example, it has long been recognized that for market
discipline to be effective, market participants must be able to make informed
decisions about the risks to which a bank is exposed. 217 Thus the primary role
215. Alan D. Morrison & Lucy White, Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance
(European Cent. Bank Working Paper No. 1196, 2010) (showing that one mechanism through
which a bank's failure can have adverse systemic consequences occurs when the failure of one bank
undermines confidence in the competence of its banking regulator).
216. Cf supra Part V.A.
217. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
1321Interbank Discipline
that regulators have played is in adopting and enforcing mandatory disclosure re-
gimes. Like other stakeholders, banks use other banks' public disclosures in their
evaluations, so this remains important. However, the value of such infor-
mation is necessarily imperfect. Banks can quickly change their risk profiles and,
as reflected in Lehman's famous "Repo 105" program, banks often will engage in
activities specifically designed to disguise aspects of their operations.218 Banks
may be particularly well situated to ferret out such efforts and otherwise obtain
inside information about another bank's activities, enabling them to make more
informed decisions and impose higher quality discipline. For banks to do so,
however, traders and other persons within the disciplining bank who have infor-
mation about the risks to which other banks are exposed must convey this
information to the disciplining bank's credit risk management division. This
suggests that in addition to disclosure, bank regulators could improve market dis-
cipline by facilitating the formation and use of appropriate lines of communica-
tion within a bank, to the extent it is legal and appropriate. While banks have
private incentives for implementing systems, the rate at which such systems are
created and used might be aided by on-site oversight.
Regulators could also help ensure that banks remain diligent about moni-
toring and disciplining other banks even when times are good. Among the fac-
tors contributing to systemic crises is the cyclical nature of credit conditions,
facilitated by the tendency of market participants to alter their assessments of risk
in light of recent conditions.219 While regulators can succumb to the same biases
as market participants, their differential incentives could be used to try to pro-
mote a longer-term perspective and find ways to counteract this tendency.
2. Use Information
A final benefit of interbank discipline is that it may produce valuable infor-
mation about the riskiness of various banks. One way that the current regulatory
scheme might harness this valuable information is by using it as one of the fac-
tors affecting the premiums the FDIC charges for deposit insurance. For exam-
ple, the FDIC could add CDS spreads, which are influenced by interbank
discipline, to the factors it considers when calculating the premium that should
be paid by a complex bank. The FDIC already uses a different formula for large,
218. David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in
Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 164 (2012) (describing "the now-infamous Repo 105
transactions that Lehman employed at the end of each quarter to disguise the amount of its
leverage").
219. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 53-113 (McGraw-Hill Co. 2008).
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complex banks than for others and, until recently, it had used credit ratings as one
component in calculating its assessments.220 Because CDS spreads are distorted
by expectations that a bank may be bailed out and other factors, the FDIC should
exercise caution and consider making adjustments. But this is no reason for it
not to use this valuable market-based information about a bank's riskiness in
making its assessment.221 Regulators might also consider other ways of incorpo-
rating banks' assessments of other banks, or market measures reflecting those as-
sessments, into their examination and other procedures. 222
CONCLUSION
Bank connectivity and interbank discipline are not new phenomena. The
fundamental changes in banking that have occurred over the last three decades,
however, have transformed the nature and magnitude of the relationships among
banks and their credit exposures to one another. Interbank discipline is now a
critical market force influencing banks' risk taking and other activities. This Ar-
ticle draws much needed attention to this development and the policy ramifica-
tions that follow, but it should mark but the first step in an ongoing examination
of interbank discipline, its effects, and the future of bank examination.
220. Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,672, 10,688 (Feb. 25, 2011) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 327).
221. Id. at 10,699 (explaining that the FDIC "retain[s] the ability to adjust the total score for large insti-
tutions and highly complex institutions by a maximum of 15 points, up or down, based upon sig-
nificant risk factors that are not captured in the scorecards" and acknowledging that the FDIC is
still determining how it will use that discretion).
222. Eg., Hart & Zingales, supra note 40, at 25--30 (arguing for the issuance of contingent capital and
suggesting that CDS spreads be used as a trigger for conversion from debt to equity).
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